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Article

The Missing Pieces of Geoengineering
Research Governance
Albert C. Lin

†

INTRODUCTION
1

Geoengineering research is at a crossroads. With growing
urgency, scientists have expressed interest in moving beyond
2
computer modeling and laboratory trials. However, recent efforts to conduct field experiments have encountered strong opposition. The intensifying controversy points to the need to establish a system of geoengineering research governance. Two
research projects that received substantial media attention—
the Stratospheric Particle Injection for Climate Engineering
(SPICE) project, and an ocean fertilization experiment sponsored by a native Haida village in British Columbia—illustrate
the concerns that geoengineering field research raises.
The U.K. Research Councils commissioned the SPICE project in 2010 to investigate the potential release of aerosols into

† Professor of Law, University of California Davis School of Law.
Thanks to Dean Kevin Johnson, Associate Dean Vik Amar, and the U.C. Davis
School of Law for financial support for this project, to Jesse Reynolds, Wil
Burns, and participants at the Climate Engineering Conference 2014 and the
Berkeley Environmental Law Colloquium for their thoughtful questions and
comments, and to Rebecca LaGrandeur Harms for her research assistance.
Copyright © 2016 by Albert C. Lin.
1. Geoengineering is a catch-all term for various proposed climate
change policy responses that do not constitute reduction of greenhouse gas
emissions or adaptation. See Albert C. Lin, Geoengineering, in GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S. LAW 715, 715 (Michael B. Gerrard & Jody Freeman
eds., 2d ed. 2014); see also infra Part I.A (defining geoengineering and discussing examples).
2. See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, CLIMATE INTERVENTION: REFLECTING SUNLIGHT TO COOL EARTH 152 (2015) (recommending development
of a research program on methods to modify the Earth’s reflectivity, including
small-scale field experiments); Jane C.S. Long et al., Start Research on Climate Engineering, 518 NATURE 29, 30 (2015) (urging commencement of smallscale outdoor experiments).
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3

the stratosphere to block solar radiation. The project originally
involved a modest field component in addition to desk-based
4
and computer modeling work. In the field component, scientists planned to spray 150 liters of water from a tethered balloon and to observe the contraption’s movements under varying
5
wind conditions. The experiment would have blocked virtually
6
no solar radiation and carried little if any physical risks. Furthermore, the experiment was subject to typical university research oversight as well as additional review by a panel of sci7
entists and social scientists. Two key concerns nonetheless led
8
to the field experiment’s cancellation. First, several project researchers had filed a patent application for the experimental
9
mechanism, prompting objections regarding their motives. Second, and more importantly, critics worried that the experiment signified a growing commitment to geoengineering de10
ployment. In contrast to the investigation of basic scientific
principles, research regarding a specific geoengineering technique takes place with an operational objective in mind: deployment of the technique. Hastily moving forward with research, it is feared, could enable eventual deployment without
sufficient public discussion or informed deliberation by policy
11
makers.
3. See Aims and Background, SPICE, http://www.spice.ac.uk/about-us/
aims-and-background (last visited Apr. 16, 2016); see also Nick Pidgeon et al.,
Deliberating Stratospheric Aerosols for Climate Geoengineering and the SPICE
Project, 3 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 451, 452 (2013). Aerosols are minute particles suspended in the atmosphere. See Atmospheric Aerosols: What Are They,
and Why Are They So Important?, NASA, http://www.nasa.gov/centers/langley/
news/factsheets/Aerosols.html (last updated July 31, 2015).
4. Pidgeon et al., supra note 3.
5. See David E. Winickoff & Mark B. Brown, Time for a Government Advisory Committee on Geoengineering Research, ISSUES SCI. & TECH., Summer
2013, at 79, 80; see also Pidgeon et al., supra note 3.
6. See Winickoff & Brown, supra note 5; see also Pidgeon et al., supra
note 3.
7. See Phil Macnaghten & Richard Owen, Good Governance for
Geoengineering, 479 NATURE 293, 293 (2011); Winickoff & Brown, supra note
5. This additional “Stagegate” review included a deliberative workshop with
selected members of the public to gauge their response to the field experiment.
Pidgeon et al., supra note 3.
8. See Winickoff & Brown, supra note 5; see also Jack Stilgoe et al., Public Engagement with Biotechnologies Offers Lessons for the Governance of
Geoengineering Research and Beyond, 11 PLOS BIOLOGY, no. 11, 2013, at 1, 2–
5.
9. See Winickoff & Brown, supra note 5.
10. See id.; see also Stilgoe et al., supra note 8, at 3.
11. See Stilgoe et al., supra note 8, at 5.
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In the Haida experiment, the Haida tribe provided financial backing for an American businessman, Russ George, to
dump over 100 tons of iron powder into international waters off
12
the British Columbia coast. The Haida hoped that fertilizing
the oceans with iron would stimulate the growth of plankton
13
and in time boost the local salmon fishery. However, George’s
comments and his history of promoting geoengineering revealed a further, more controversial motive: to test whether
14
ocean fertilization can sequester carbon from the atmosphere.
Once George publicly announced what he had done, experts ex15
pressed grave concerns. The experiment not only lacked proper measurement and controls, but also took place without for16
mal international sanction. Although it is contested whether
the experiment violated domestic or international law, the incident triggered a Canadian government investigation, as well as
allegations that the Canadian government itself was complicit
17
in the experiment. The controversy has magnified the reluc12. See David Biello, Can Controversial Ocean Iron Fertilization Save
Salmon?, SCI. AM. (Oct. 24, 2012), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/
fertilizing-ocean-with-iron-to-save-salmon-and-earn-money.
13. See Joshua Learn, Are Record Salmon Runs in the Northwest the Result of a Controversial CO2 Reduction Scheme?, E&E PUB. (Nov. 12, 2014),
http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060008722.
14. See Henry Fountain, A Rogue Climate Experiment Has Ocean Experts
Outraged, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2012, at A1 (noting that George had previously
proposed a similar iron fertilization project for the purpose of selling carbon
offsets); Mark Hume & Ian Bailey, Businessman Russ George Defends Experiment Seeding Pacific with Iron Sulphate, GLOBE & MAIL (Oct. 19, 2012), http://
www.theglobeandmail.com/news/british-columbia/businessman-russ-george
-defends-experiment-seeding-pacific-with-iron-sulphate/article4622528/
(reporting George’s statements that “he is out to save the world’s oceans and
demonstrate how to halt global warming”).
15. See Fountain, supra note 14. The Haida experiment followed earlier
and similarly controversial ocean fertilization experiments. See Aaron Strong
et al., Ocean Fertilization: Time To Move On, 461 NATURE 347, 348 (2009).
16. Edward A. Parson & David W. Keith, End the Deadlock on Governance of Geoengineering Research, 339 SCIENCE 1278, 1278 (2013).
17. See Joshua Learn, Legal Mess Hampers Understanding of a Major
CO2 Sequestration Test, E&E PUB. (Nov. 13, 2014), http://www.eenews.net/
stories/1060008800 (discussing a search of Haida offices); Dene Moore, Ocean
Fertilization Experiment Loses in B.C. Court; Charges Now Likely, GLOBE &
MAIL (Feb. 3, 2014), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/british-columbia/
ocean-fertilization-experiment-loses-in-bc-court-charges-now-likely/article
16672031 (reporting that the court dismissed the Haida’s application to declare the alleged offenses unenforceable and to enjoin further investigation by
the Canadian environmental agency); West Coast Ocean Fertilization Project
Defended, CBC NEWS (Oct. 19, 2012), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british
-columbia/west-coast-ocean-fertilization-project-defended-1.1226125 (recounting project leaders’ contentions that they did not violate Canadian or interna-
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tance of potential funders to support basic research in this area
and raised anxieties regarding rogue geoengineering field ex18
periments.
The fact that these field experiments generated substantial
controversy despite their limited scope suggests various concerns. A number of these concerns cluster around the theme of
a growing distrust of geoengineering researchers. The Haida
incident reinforces the stereotype of the mad scientist who
presses forward with his desired experiments, the public and
environment be damned. Indeed, both the Haida and SPICE
experiments resonate with a vigorous online discourse that
supposes the existence of an ongoing secret program of large19
scale climate modification. Moreover, the possible role of personal financial motivations in both experiments exacerbates
the public distrust. These incidents only seem to confirm the
fears of some that professional and financial gain, not scientific
merit, are driving a rush to geoengineering experimentation.
Lack of control is a second theme reflected in concerns surrounding geoengineering field experiments. The controversy
that the SPICE experiment provoked, notwithstanding the trivial physical risk associated with the experiment itself, suggests
that public worries extend beyond the hazards or scientific integrity of individual field experiments. These experiments possess an operational and symbolic significance that becomes apparent when the experiments are considered in their historical
and social contexts. One might sensibly wonder what these experiments portend for further geoengineering research—or
even deployment—and how they might alter humanity’s rela20
tionship to the environment.
tional laws); see also Fountain, supra note 14 (reporting commentator’s conclusion that the project had apparently contravened international agreements); Parson & Keith, supra note 16 (asserting that the experiment “violated no international law”).
18. See Fountain, supra note 14; Andrew C. Revkin, A Fresh Look at Iron,
Plankton, Carbon, Salmon, and Ocean Engineering, N.Y. TIMES: DOT EARTH
(July 18, 2014), http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/07/18/a-fresh-look-at
-iron-plankton-carbon-salmon-and-ocean-engineering. Preliminary accounts
suggest positive effects on the salmon fishery. See id.
19. See Rose Cairns, Climates of Suspicion: “Chemtrail” Conspiracy Narratives and the International Politics of Geoengineering, 182 GEOGRAPHICAL J.
70, 75–76 (2014) (discussing the chemtrail conspiracy narrative, consisting of
the belief that trails left by airplanes are being deliberately sprayed for various ends, including climate modification or population control).
20. See Lisa Dilling & Rachel Hauser, Governing Geoengineering Research: Why, When and How?, 121 CLIMATIC CHANGE 553, 555 (2013), http://
sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/admin/publication_files/2013.21.pdf; Stefan Schäfer
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In light of these developments, this Article finds a pressing
need for greater governance of geoengineering research. Governance refers broadly to the making and implementation of
21
rules through laws, decisions, and other mechanisms. Existing
proposals for geoengineering research governance concentrate
on the physical risks associated with individual research projects. Generally overlooked, and more difficult to address, are
the systemic concerns geoengineering research raises: technological lock-in—the danger that sustained research efforts will
predetermine geoengineering deployment decisions; moral hazard—the danger that increased attention to geoengineering will
undermine efforts to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions;
and the potential for geoengineering research to contribute to
future global conflict. This Article tackles the difficult but essential task of developing mechanisms to address these systemic concerns in addition to the physical risks of geoengineering
research.
Part I of this Article addresses preliminary issues, makes
the case for governance of geoengineering research, and surveys examples of research governance in other fields. Part II
reviews existing proposals for geoengineering research governance and finds that they fail to address important, systemic
concerns regarding technological lock-in, moral hazard, and potential military conflict. Part III discusses the desired characteristics of a prospective geoengineering research governance
regime and offers specific recommendations. An ongoing programmatic technology assessment can analyze systemic concerns and promote public deliberation on geoengineering research and deployment. Policy makers can use the results of
such an assessment to inform decisions and institute safeguards against the physical and systemic hazards of
geoengineering research.

et al., Correspondence: Field Tests of Solar Climate Engineering, 3 NATURE
CLIMATE CHANGE 766, 766 (2013).
21. See RALPH BODLE ET AL., FED. ENVT’L AGENCY, GER., OPTIONS AND
PROPOSALS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE OF GEOENGINEERING 13
(Section I 1.3 Environmental Law & Friederike Domke eds., 2014) (defining
governance to include “formal and informal, implicit and explicit processes,
procedures and institutions”); Daniel Bodansky, The Who, What, and Wherefore of Geoengineering Governance, 121 CLIMATIC CHANGE 539, 541–45 (2013)
(discussing basic issues of governance); see also NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
supra note 2, at 10 (noting the wide variety of forms research governance may
take).
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I. BACKGROUND
A. PRELIMINARY ISSUES
There are several preliminary issues that merit attention
before delving into the case for and design of geoengineering
research governance.
First, what is geoengineering? Developing a working definition of geoengineering will help to establish a common base22
line for discussion and a predictable governance regime.
Although the term lacks an undisputed meaning, most accounts include elements of scale and intent: geoengineering is
large if not planetary in scale, and it is intended to counter ele23
vated GHG concentrations or their impacts. Proposals for
geoengineering fall into two broad categories: carbon dioxide
removal (CDR) and solar radiation management (SRM). CDR
techniques strive to remove carbon dioxide (CO2) from the at24
mosphere and to store it elsewhere. Examples include ocean
fertilization, direct capture, biochar, and enhanced weather25
ing. SRM techniques attempt to reduce the amount of radiation absorbed by the Earth but do not reduce atmospheric GHG
26
concentrations. Examples of SRM techniques include stratospheric aerosol release, cloud whitening, and space-based de27
flectors. Stratospheric aerosol release, which would deploy tiny particles in the stratosphere to reflect sunlight into space,
has been the subject of much attention because some perceive it
as a relatively quick and inexpensive global response to climate
22. See BODLE ET AL., supra note 21, at 137.
23. See id. at 14, 43–46; David W. Keith, Box 1: Geoengineering, 409 NATURE 420, 420 (2001); see also PHILLIP WILLIAMSON ET AL., GEOENGINEERING
IN RELATION TO THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY: TECHNICAL AND
REGULATORY MATTERS 23 (Technical Series No. 66, 2012), http://www
.cbd.int/doc/publications/cbd-ts-66-en.pdf (summarizing selected definitions of
geoengineering and defining the term as “a deliberate intervention in the
planetary environment of a nature and scale intended to counteract anthropogenic climate change and its impacts”).
24. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 2, box S.1; Lin, supra
note 1, at 716–19.
25. See Lin, supra note 1, at 716–17. For a more detailed description of
each of these examples, see generally NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, CLIMATE INTERVENTION: CARBON DIOXIDE REMOVAL AND RELIABLE SEQUESTRATION
(2015).
26. See Lin, supra note 1, at 717–19; see also NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
supra note 2, at 2, box S.1 (referring to SRM as “albedo modification”).
27. See Lin, supra note 1, at 717–19. See generally NAT’L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 66–132 (describing in detail these and other SRM
techniques).
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change. Presently, no proposed geoengineering technique is
ready for deployment at a scale that would substantially ad29
dress the impacts of climate change.
The techniques falling under the rubric of geoengineering
differ significantly in their methodologies, levels of risk, and
30
feasibility. Of course, any characterization of specific techniques at this time is preliminary and rests on untested assumptions. Several general observations nevertheless seem
reasonable. Some techniques could be implemented incrementally at a modest scale and within national boundaries, whereas others would require global implementation. Relatedly, some
techniques—such as ocean fertilization and stratospheric aerosol release—would pose greater transboundary risks than oth31
ers. Because they are aimed directly at atmospheric GHGs,
CDR techniques would generally be slower acting, and aside
from the technique of ocean fertilization, potentially less
32
risky. SRM techniques, in contrast, would involve greater
risks and uncertainties because they would only alleviate some
of climate change’s symptoms rather than address its root
33
causes. Proposed geoengineering techniques also differ in
their apparent feasibility, as each technique faces various economic, technical, and political challenges. The inclusion of all
geoengineering techniques within a system of research governance would promote coordination, priority setting, and public
trust. At the same time, design of oversight should take into account relevant differences between techniques. SRM techniques
warrant particular scrutiny not only because of their greater
potential risks, but also because of the systemic concerns they
tend to raise.
28. See, e.g., ROYAL SOC’Y, GEOENGINEERING THE CLIMATE: SCIENCE,
GOVERNANCE, AND UNCERTAINTY 31 tbl.3.4 (2009) (preliminarily evaluating
stratospheric aerosols as high in terms of effectiveness, affordability, and
timeliness, but low in terms of safety); Parson & Keith, supra note 16 (commenting that “attention and controversy have centered on methods to reduce
incoming sunlight,” including stratospheric aerosol release).
29. See ROYAL SOC’Y, supra note 28, at 57 (concluding that various
geoengineering methods “are unlikely to be ready for deployment in the short
to medium term”).
30. BODLE ET AL., supra note 21, at 40.
31. See id. at 20.
32. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 2–4; Edward A. Parson & Lia N. Ernst, International Governance of Climate Engineering, 14
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 307, 313, 316 (2013).
33. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 3, 5–7; Lin, supra note
1, at 715, 718.
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A second question regards whether governance should focus on geoengineering research, deployment, or both. The controversy generated by the Haida and SPICE experiments suggests a growing urgency in the need for governance of field
experimentation. In contrast to the case for governance of research, which is discussed more thoroughly below, the case for
governance of deployment is less pressing, with any deploy34
ment likely to be decades or more away. Whether adequate
governance of research is possible without also governing deployment presents a difficult question. A governance structure
established for research may establish a precedent for later
35
governance of deployment. Moreover, to the extent that
geoengineering research efforts have the ultimate aim of deployment, research governance arguably would serve as an indirect form of deployment governance. Any attempt to separate
governance functions may be further complicated by the difficulty of distinguishing large-scale field experiments from full36
scale deployment. For stratospheric aerosol release, for example, the most informative way to test efficacy and risks—and
perhaps the only reliable way to do so—may involve full-scale
37
and extended deployment.
Notwithstanding these points, focusing on research governance is appropriate. Attempting to establish governance of
both deployment and research could prove to be a distraction. If
governance of both deployment and research are grouped together, policy makers and stakeholders might perceive
geoengineering governance to be less urgent generally and thus
less worthy of action. Although geoengineering deployment
raises important and challenging governance issues, many of
38
these issues are distinct from those posed by field research.
34. See Parson & Ernst, supra note 32, at 331 (distinguishing long-term
tasks of regulatory and security governance from “near-term tasks of research,
technology development, and risk assessment[, which] may remain the principal governance needs for a decade or more”); cf. DAVID KEITH, A CASE FOR
CLIMATE ENGINEERING 87–88 (2013) (projecting deployment of stratospheric
aerosols no earlier than 2025 or “more realistically, 2035 with missteps and
surprises”).
35. See BODLE ET AL., supra note 21, at 21; cf. Parson & Ernst, supra note
32, at 329 (“[T]here will not be a clean boundary between an early period of
‘scientific’ [geoengineering] governance and some later period of ‘operational’
governance.”).
36. See Alan Robock et al., A Test for Geoengineering?, 327 SCIENCE 530,
530–31 (2010).
37. See id.
38. See infra text accompanying notes 347–49.
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Resolving these issues at this time is unlikely, and seeking to
39
do so would unnecessarily complicate governance efforts.
A governance effort focused on research would need to settle on an approach for determining which research projects require oversight. An effects-based approach would regulate research projects whose environmental impacts potentially
40
exceed a certain threshold. Research projects below the
threshold would not receive particular geoengineering-related
scrutiny, though they would have to comply with any otherwise
applicable laws. However, an approach centered on individual
projects would tend to overlook cumulative effects and the ways
in which seemingly insignificant projects could contribute to
the overall development of a geoengineering technique. A purpose-based approach would regulate all research activities that
have a geoengineering purpose. A project’s purpose could be defined subjectively or objectively. A subjective definition of purpose—based on a researcher’s declared objective or justification
for a project—would rely on the good faith of researchers to
41
identify geoengineering experiments. Such an approach,
which would create an incentive to conceal the actual purpose
of a geoengineering experiment, may fail to earn the public
42
trust. An objective definition of purpose—based on an independent determination of whether research might reasonably
advance a geoengineering technique—may more readily garner
public confidence. At the same time, it would be more difficult
to administer, potentially necessitating the burdensome and
politically fraught screening of numerous climate-related re43
search projects. Ultimately, these difficulties, along with the
desirability of accounting for cumulative and systemic concerns, argue for an approach that combines a subjective definition of purpose with a list of objectively defined specific activi-

39. See Parson & Ernst, supra note 32, at 331 (suggesting that it “may . . .
be possible to defer most high-stakes and potentially divisive questions of regulatory and security governance”).
40. See Parson & Keith, supra note 16, at 1279.
41. Cf. Dilling & Hauser, supra note 20, at 562 (proposing that research
“justified by investigators or programs as informing the idea of intentionally
manipulating the earth’s climate . . . be classified as geoengineering research”).
42. See Parson & Keith, supra note 16.
43. See Bronislaw Szerszynski et al., Why Solar Radiation Management
Geoengineering and Democracy Won’t Mix, 45 ENV’T & PLANNING A 2809, 2813
(2013).
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44

ties. Under this approach, research activities would be subject
to governance if they either incorporate a geoengineering purpose as a declared objective or fall within designated categories
of geoengineering research activities.
B. THE CASE FOR RESEARCH GOVERNANCE
But is governance of geoengineering research even necessary? Scientists generally enjoy freedom of research, subject to
informed consent and other ethical limits on human and ani45
mal experimentation. This freedom, which is recognized or
46
supported in various laws and treaties, encompasses the autonomy to decide on research projects and approaches without
47
political interference. Underlying the principle is the presumption that research generates knowledge, and knowledge is
socially desirable, both as an inherent matter and because it
48
enables informed democratic choices. In the United States,
freedom of research is reflected in the “social contract for science”: in exchange for public funding, scientists provide
44. Cf. BODLE ET AL., supra note 21, at 136 (suggesting a geoengineering
definition be sufficiently broad to cover a wide range of methods and also include a list that expressly mentions specific techniques).
45. See Gary E. Marchant & Lynda L. Pope, The Problems with Forbidding Science, 15 SCI. & ENGINEERING ETHICS 375, 377 (2009) (“There is a
strong presumption in modern industrialized democracies, endorsed by most
scientists, in favor of minimal government interference in the content of basic
scientific research.”); Peter Singer, Ethics and the Limits of Scientific Freedom, 79 MONIST 218, 218–20 (1996). While some assert that scientists have a
right to research, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized no such right, and
any such right arguably rests on the extent to which a research inquiry supports democratic governance. See Mark B. Brown & David H. Guston, Science,
Democracy, and the Right To Research, 15 SCI. & ENGINEERING ETHICS 351,
362 (2009).
46. See BODLE ET AL., supra note 21, at 140; Jesse Reynolds, Climate Engineering Field Research: The Favorable Setting of International Environmental Law, 5 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY CLIMATE & ENV’T 417, 430–31 (2014) (noting various multilateral environmental treaties that encourage scientific
research); see also Ralph Cicerone, Geoengineering: Encouraging Research and
Overseeing Implementation, 77 CLIMATIC CHANGE 221, 224 (2006) (“Freedom
of inquiry itself has moral value.”). Indeed, detailed formal international regulation of any area of research is unprecedented. See SOLAR RADIATION MGMT.
GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE, SOLAR RADIATION MANAGEMENT: THE GOVERNANCE
OF RESEARCH 33 (2011).
47. See Torsten Wilholt, Scientific Freedom: Its Grounds and Their Limitations, 41 STUD. HIST. & PHIL. SCI. 174, 174–75 (2010); Scientific Freedom
and the Public Good, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (2008), http://www
.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/scientific_integrity/
scientific_freedom.pdf.
48. See Wilholt, supra note 47, at 175–78.
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knowledge to society while themselves determining the aims of
49
research as well as its governing standards. Although the social contract for science has come under attack in recent years,
it continues to dominate popular conceptions of scientists’
50
role.
Against the tradition of scientific freedom, calls for governance of geoengineering research require justification. The case
for such governance is rooted in the frustration of what some
scientists perceive as increasingly urgent field research.
Geoengineering research is growing rapidly, and interest in
51
conducting field experiments is on the rise. Most research to
date has been confined to computer modeling or indoor research, prompting various expert bodies, scientists, and com52
mentators to contend that field research is necessary. A research agenda could address the feasibility of specific
techniques, their interaction with changing climate conditions,
the geographic distribution of effects, the controllability and ef-

49. See Sheila Jasanoff, Technologies of Humility: Citizen Participation in
Governing Science, 41 MINERVA 223, 227–28 (2003).
50. See id. at 228–29.
51. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 155–56 (recommending small-scale field studies to investigate potential viability of albedo modification techniques); see also CLIVE HAMILTON, EARTHMASTERS: THE DAWN OF
THE AGE OF CLIMATE ENGINEERING 17 (2013) (noting growth of the
geoengineering research network); M. Granger Morgan et al., Needed: Research Guidelines for Solar Radiation Management, 29 ISSUES SCI. & TECH.
37, 41 (2013) (discussing “calls for a significantly expanded research program
on SRM”); Parson & Ernst, supra note 32, at 309 (noting the “sharp increase
in attention to climate engineering (CE) technologies”); Rob Bellamy, Safety
First! Framing and Governing Climate Geoengineering Experimentation 14
(Climate Geoegineering Governance Working Paper Series, No. 014, 2014)
http://www.geoengineering-governance-research.org/perch/resources/
workingpaper14bellamysafetyfirst.pdf (identifying the “need to know more” as
a prevalent theme in geoengineering discourse).
52. See, e.g., GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO 11-71, TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT: CLIMATE ENGINEERING: TECHNICAL STATUS, FUTURE DIRECTIONS, AND POTENTIAL RESPONSES 49 (2011) (reporting that the majority of
experts consulted in the study “advocated starting significant climate engineering research now or in the very near future”); BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR.,
TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE REMEDIATION RESEARCH, GEOENGINEERING: A NATIONAL STRATEGIC PLAN FOR RESEARCH ON THE POTENTIAL EFFECTIVENESS,
FEASIBILITY, AND CONSEQUENCES OF CLIMATE REMEDIATION TECHNOLOGIES
20 (2011) [hereinafter BPC] (“Time is of the essence in establishing a thoughtful research program. . . .”); ROYAL SOC’Y, supra note 28, at 61 (“Research is
urgently needed for evaluating which methods are feasible, and to identify potential risks.”); Parson & Ernst, supra note 32, at 322 (asserting that a consensus exists that research into the feasibility, effects, and potential risks of
CE technologies “should begin immediately”).
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fects of regional interventions, and the identification and at53
tribution of harmful effects. SRM field research, for example,
could take the form of small-scale experiments to increase understanding of physical, chemical, and radiative properties in
the atmosphere; atmospheric studies across a range of scales to
determine the applicability of models at different scales; globalscale experiments to measure risks and climate response; and
54
tests of technologies for deploying SRM.
A commonly proffered rationale for geoengineering research is for society to be well-informed of the effectiveness and
risks of various techniques “if and when geoengineering be55
comes necessary.” Current geoengineering proposals are
56
sometimes described as “speculative,” and years or decades of
research would likely be needed before deployment of any tech57
nique. In the absence of sufficient research, some commentators warn, society could find itself in a “policy train wreck” in
which “only unrefined, untested, and excessively risky ap58
proaches will be available” should a climate emergency occur.
Even some who are more skeptical of the need for
geoengineering believe that research can inform discussions
59
and decisions regarding its potential use. Research might be
53. See BPC, supra note 52, at 24–26; Parson & Ernst, supra note 32, at
328.
54. See David W. Keith et al., Field Experiments on Solar Geoengineering:
Report of a Workshop Exploring a Representative Research Portfolio, PHIL.
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A, Nov. 17, 2014, at 1, 2–4.
55. Bodansky, supra note 21, at 546; see also BPC, supra note 52, at 14;
Parson & Keith, supra note 16.
56. Steve Rayner et al., The Oxford Principles, 121 CLIMATIC CHANGE
499, 501 (2013) (noting the need for “extensive research” into the “technical,
environmental, socio-political, ethical and economic characteristics” of all
geoengineering technologies).
57. See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 52; Parson & Ernst,
supra note 32, at 322 (noting present ignorance regarding “how well specific
interventions and delivery methods would work”).
58. Parson & Keith, supra note 16, at 1279. The use of “emergency” rhetoric in connection with geoengineering, let alone the determination of what
might constitute a climate emergency, poses serious difficulties. See Nils
Markusson et al., “In Case of Emergency Press Here”: Framing Geoengineering
as a Response to Dangerous Climate Change, 5 WIRES CLIMATE CHANGE 281,
284, 288 (2014).
59. See BPC, supra note 52, at 3; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 2,
at 8–9; ROYAL SOC’Y, supra note 28, at 49, 52; Alan Robock, Stratospheric Aerosol Geoengineering, in GEOENGINEERING OF THE CLIMATE SYSTEM 162, 181
(R.E. Hester et al. eds., 2014); David G. Victor et al., The Geoengineering Option: A Last Resort Against Global Warming?, FOREIGN AFF., Mar./Apr. 2009,
at 64, 74 (contending that research “would transform the discussion about
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valuable even if nations or the international community ultimately reject geoengineering, as it can facilitate the detection
60
and countering of unauthorized geoengineering efforts.
Notwithstanding scientists’ increasing interest in
geoengineering research, overall funding for research remains
modest and funding for field experimentation is especially lim61
ited. Exact funding data is difficult to gather in the absence of
62
a clear operational definition of geoengineering, but estimates
63
generally characterize research amounts as “very low.” The
most prominent national funding effort, the SPICE project,
consists of £1.6 million in total research support spread out
64
over several years. The United States lacks a dedicated research program, with existing geoengineering research efforts
occurring largely as part of broader climate and atmospheric
65
science programs. Private individuals, including Bill Gates,
66
provide a significant share of research support. Yet even this
support is relatively modest in terms of the scale of research it
67
enables. Gates, for example, has contributed $4.6 million to a
68
fund administered by two leading geoengineering researchers.

geoengineering from an abstract debate into one focused on real risk assessment”).
60. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 10; Mark G. Lawrence, The Geoengineering Dilemma: To Speak or Not To Speak, 77 CLIMATIC
CHANGE 245, 246 (2006).
61. A 2010 GAO report estimated total U.S. government spending on direct geoengineering research at less than $2 million. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, GAO-10-903, CLIMATE CHANGE: A COORDINATED STRATEGY COULD
FOCUS FEDERAL GEOENGINEERING RESEARCH AND INFORM GOVERNANCE EFFORTS 19 (2010) [hereinafter GAO-10-903]. A 2013 estimate of the total
amount worldwide being spent on ongoing SRM research projects was $20–25
million. Geoengineering Research, GIVEWELL, http://www.givewell.org/labs/
causes/geoengineering#footnoteref21_nhq5rn9 (last visited Apr. 16, 2016).
62. See GAO-10-903, supra note 61, at 23.
63. See, e.g., Bodansky, supra note 21, at 546.
64. See Daniel Cressey, Cancelled Project Spurs Debate over
Geoengineering Patents, 485 NATURE 429 (2012).
65. See GAO-10-903, supra note 61, at 23; Morgan et al., supra note 51.
66. See HAMILTON, supra note 51, at 77 (characterizing Gates as “the
world’s leading financial supporter of geoengineering research” and discussing
Richard Branson’s offer of a $25 million prize for developing a plan to extract
carbon from the atmosphere); Bodansky, supra note 21, at 546; John Vidal,
Bill Gates Backs Climate Scientists Lobbying for Large-Scale Geoengineering,
GUARDIAN (Feb. 6, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/feb/06/
bill-gates-climate-scientists-geoengineering.
67. See Alan Robock, Is Geoengineering Research Ethical?, 4 SICHERHEIT
& FRIEDEN 226, 228 (“[A] larger fraction of current geoengineering research
funding comes from the US$1,000,000 per year that Bill Gates gives to David
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Potential funders have shied away particularly from field
research because of its controversial nature. As the Haida and
SPICE incidents suggest, concerns extend beyond any immediate physical risks that experiments might pose. The case for
oversight rests equally on the goal-directed nature of
geoengineering research and on the contested nature of that
goal. The primary aim of such research is not to generate pure
scientific knowledge nor to develop innovations that could be
applied in the market, but rather to create specific deployable
69
mechanisms
for
deliberately
altering
the
climate.
Geoengineering research warrants external governance and
public engagement because the research itself carries significant and controversial policy implications and can alter the pol70
icy environment in which decisions are made. In the absence
of legitimate and effective governance, additional field research
71
will lead to further controversy, which in turn could stymie
transparent and accountable research efforts while spawning a
rise in furtive experimentation.
At present, there is no general system of oversight for
geoengineering field experimentation. Nor do mechanisms exist
to ensure attention to concerns regarding the broader implications of research. As one analysis concludes, “almost none of
[international environmental law] was developed with climate
72
engineering in mind.” Indeed, that analysis suggests that international law “favor[s]” geoengineering research because it
could develop methods for reducing climate risk to humans and
73
the environment. While the reduction of climate risks indeed
74
would be consistent with several environmental agreements,
international environmental law provides no definitive guidance in this regard. For example, the precautionary principle,
Keith and Ken Caldeira.”); see also Vidal, supra note 66 (reporting that Gates
has funded $4.6 million worth of geoengineering research).
68. The researchers, David Keith and Ken Caldeira, “select projects that
receive support from the fund.” See FUND FOR INNOVATIVE CLIMATE & ENERGY
RESEARCH, http://dge.stanford.edu/labs/caldeiralab/FICER.html (last visited
Apr. 16, 2016).
69. See Dilling & Hauser, supra note 20 (“This intentionality of the research program places geoengineering clearly in the sphere of science for policy, or usable science.”).
70. See id.
71. See Rayner et al., supra note 56 (“[C]ontroversies will only increase
over time if research is allowed to continue.”).
72. Reynolds, supra note 46, at 480.
73. Id.
74. See id. at 480–81.
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which some characterize as an emerging customary principle of
75
international environmental law, could be interpreted as ei76
ther encouraging or discouraging geoengineering research.
Likewise, the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate
Change’s objective of avoiding “dangerous anthropogenic inter77
ference” with the climate system leaves open the question of
whether geoengineering itself might constitute dangerous anthropogenic interference.
To date, two international treaty regimes have specifically
addressed the issue of geoengineering research. The parties to
the London Convention and London Protocol (LC/LP) have developed an incipient oversight system for field research on
ocean fertilization and other marine-based geoengineering
techniques. As a general matter, the LC/LP prohibit the deliberate disposal of waste at sea, but allow placement of matter
78
for purposes other than disposal. In 2008, the parties to these
agreements adopted a resolution opposing “ocean fertilization
79
activities other than legitimate scientific research.” A 2010
resolution encourages member-states to review proposed ocean
fertilization activity under an assessment framework to determine whether it constitutes legitimate scientific research and
80
to assess its environmental impacts. The assessment framework also recommends a process to notify potentially affected
countries, explain potential impacts, encourage scientific coop-

75. A leading articulation of the precautionary principle declares that
“[w]here there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective
measures to prevent environmental degradation.” U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Aug. 12, 1992).
76. See Lin, supra note 1.
77. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 2,
May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 164.
78. 1996 Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution
by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, arts. 1.4.1, 1.4.2.2, 4, Nov. 7, 1996,
36 I.L.M. 1; see Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping
of Wastes and Other Matter, art. III.1(a), Dec. 29, 1972, 1046 U.N.T.S. 140 (referring to “deliberate disposal at sea,” as opposed to “deliberate disposal into
the sea”).
79. London Convention and Protocol, Resolution LC-LP.1 (2008) on the
Regulation of Ocean Fertilization, LC 30/16 (Oct. 31, 2008).
80. London Convention and Protocol, Resolution LC-LP.2 (2010) on the
Assessment Framework for Scientific Research Involving Ocean Fertilization
(Oct. 14, 2010).
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81

eration, and provide for ongoing consultation. Building on the
2008 and 2010 resolutions, the parties to the London Protocol
later adopted an amendment to the protocol. If ratified, the
amendment would make the assessment and permitting process binding and expand its application to other marine
82
geoengineering activities. Permits would issue only if a proposed activity is not contrary to the aims of the London Protocol
and an environmental assessment determines that pollution
83
and detriment would be prevented or minimized.
Field experiments outside the marine environment lie beyond the scope of the LC/LP. Of particular concern are SRM
techniques, which could involve experimentation and deploy84
ment on a global scale. The most frequently discussed SRM
techniques, stratospheric aerosol release and cloud brightening,
would involve field trials in the atmosphere, where there is no
existing treaty regime possessing obvious oversight responsibil85
ity. The parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity
(CBD), a treaty that promotes biodiversity primarily through
86
national laws and policies, have attempted to fill this void.
Specifically, the CBD parties adopted a decision discouraging
geoengineering activities potentially affecting biodiversity, with
the exception of “small scale scientific research studies . . . in a
87
controlled setting.” Such research, the decision cautions,
should occur only if subject to a prior environmental assessment and justified by the need to gather specific scientific da88
ta. Notably, the decision is nonbinding and has no force in the

81. The Assessment Framework can be found at Report of the Thirty-Fifth
Consultative Meeting and the Eighth Meeting of Contracting Parties to the
London Convention, LC 35/15, annex 6 (2013).
82. Resolution LP.4(8) on the Amendment to the London Protocol to Regulate the Placement of Matter for Ocean Fertilization and Other Marine
Geoengineering Activities, LC 35/15, annex 4, at 8–9 (Oct. 18, 2013) [hereinafter Resolution LP.4(8)].
83. Id. at 8.
84. See SOLAR RADIATION MGMT. GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE, supra note 46,
at 14–16.
85. See Lin, supra note 1, at 730–31 (discussing international legal regimes governing air pollution).
86. Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 143
[hereinafter CBD], http://www.cbd.int/convention/convention.shtml.
87. Decision Adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention
on Biological Diversity, X/33: Biodiversity and Climate Change, ¶ 8(w), Oct.
29, 2010, UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/33 [hereinafter Decision by the Parties to
the CBD].
88. Id.
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United States, which is not a party to the CBD. Moreover, the
decision does not define critical terms such as “small scale scientific research studies” and “controlled setting,” and in contrast to the LC/LP’s assessment framework, provides little
90
guidance to member-states regarding implementation.
To sum up, support for and concern about geoengineering
research are both on the rise. On the one hand, the worsening
climate situation and dim prospects for meaningful GHG mitigation efforts make increasingly important the exploration of a
variety of responses to climate change. Geoengineering research can generate valuable information for deciding whether
geoengineering options might be viable and how they might be
91
used. On the other hand, the field experimentation that would
be necessary to evaluate geoengineering options or to deploy
them has largely been stymied. Geoengineering research is in a
state of “deadlock” where even publicly sponsored and seeming92
ly harmless field experiments are unable to proceed.
Should this deadlock remain unresolved, one can expect
further controversy, a continued reluctance to fund even publicly accountable tests, and a rise in furtive experimentation. As
climate change’s effects become more pronounced, the pressure
to explore and ultimately deploy geoengineering will only in93
At the same time, increased attention to
tensify.

89. The CBD does not authorize its Conference of the Parties to adopt legally binding decisions. Accordingly, one commentator characterizes CBD decisions as “‘soft law’ of a primarily political nature.” ALEXANDER PROELSS, LEGAL OPINION ON THE LEGALITY OF THE LOHAFEX MARINE RESEARCH
EXPERIMENT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 9 (2009), http://www.internat-recht
.uni-kiel.de/de/forschung/opinions/LOHAFEX_en.pdf. For a list of parties that
have ratified the CBD, see List of Parties, CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, http://www.cbd.int/convention/parties/list (last visited Apr. 16, 2016).
90. For further discussion of the shortcomings of the CBD decisions, see
BODLE ET AL., supra note 21, at 59, 152–53.
91. See BPC, supra note 52, at 29; Bodansky, supra note 21, at 546.
92. Parson and Keith use the term “deadlock” to characterize the current
governance of geoengineering research: namely, the increasingly polarized debate regarding such questions as whether government regulation is needed
and whether large-scale research requires greater oversight. Parson & Keith,
supra note 16. But cf. Schäfer et al., supra note 20 (contending that “there is
no deadlock on climate engineering governance”). In my view, the term deadlock better characterizes the present state of geoengineering field experimentation.
93. See Bodansky, supra note 21, at 540 (observing that “grim outlook”
regarding rising global GHG emissions “has led many to take a second look at
geoengineering”); see also INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY 1065
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geoengineering is unlikely to dissipate public discomfort and
94
uncertainties associated with many geoengineering proposals.
In such circumstances, states will remain hesitant to openly
undertake or sponsor field experiments. Polarized views on the
subject may make it difficult for states to adopt any policy on
95
geoengineering whatsoever. And without a clear system of
governance, projects lacking external oversight and peer review
may become more common. The establishment of a credible research governance structure could break the deadlock by
providing assurance that geoengineers are not performing uncontrolled experiments or embarking on a course leading to
full-scale deployment without official sanction.
C. MODELS FOR RESEARCH GOVERNANCE
International law provides little guidance for establishing
a system of research oversight. International environmental
law generally favors scientific research, and precedents for governing field experimentation, particularly in its early stages,
96
are limited. For instance, the UN Convention on the Law of
the Sea, which contains relatively detailed provisions on research, affirms the right of states and “competent international
organizations” “to conduct marine scientific research subject to
the rights and duties of other States” and encourages the exer97
cise of this right. The right to conduct research is subject to
procedural and substantive obligations designed to protect oth98
er states from transboundary harm. Beyond such obligations,
(2014) (discussing geoengineering and noting the “increasing attention” it has
received in the scientific literature).
94. See Nick Pidgeon et al., Exploring Early Public Responses to
Geoengineering, 370 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A 4176, 4177 (2012);
cf. Adam Corner et al., “Experiment Earth?” Reflections on a Public
Dialogue on Geoengineering 18 (unpublished manuscript), http://psych.cf.ac
.uk/understandingrisk/docs/experiment_earth.pdf (last visited Apr. 16, 2016)
(reporting a weak positive correlation between knowledge about CDR and
support for CDR and a negative correlation between knowledge about SRM
and support for SRM).
95. See BODLE ET AL., supra note 21, at 131.
96. See Reynolds, supra note 46.
97. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, arts. 238, 239, Dec.
10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS], http://www.un.org/Depts/
los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm. The Convention on the
Law of the Sea is one of the few treaties potentially relevant to geoengineering
that contains detailed provisions governing research. See Reynolds, supra note
46, at 431.
98. See, e.g., UNCLOS, supra note 97, art. 242(1) (describing obligation of
state conducting research to provide other states an opportunity to obtain in-
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though, the convention contains no provisions for comprehensive oversight of research.
Experience under another environmental treaty, the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, warns
against excessive deference to treaty members in the oversight
of scientific research. This convention’s governing body established an indefinite moratorium on commercial whaling in
99
1982. However, parties to the convention may issue permits
authorizing the killing of whales for purposes of scientific research “subject to such restrictions as to number and . . . such
100
other conditions as [each party] thinks fit.” Contending that
the killing of hundreds of whales per year is necessary for research purposes, Japan has made liberal use of these permits
101
to circumvent the moratorium. Japan vows to continue its
whaling program even in the face of strong international condemnation and an International Court of Justice finding that it
102
lacks scientific merit. The ongoing conflict illustrates not only
the difficulty of defining and policing research, but also the inability to avoid value-laden policy determinations by deferring
103
to scientific expertise.
Perhaps the most instructive precedent for geoengineering
research governance comes from the field of recombinant DNA
(rDNA) research. In the early 1970s, rDNA researchers faced a
research deadlock resembling that confronting geoengineering
researchers today. Scientists, policy makers, and the public
worried that rDNA experiments might wreak havoc if they accidentally released genetically altered organisms into the envi-

formation necessary to prevent and control damage to human health and marine environment); id. at art. 246 (describing right of coastal states to regulate
research in their exclusive economic zone and continental shelf); Reynolds, supra note 46, at 475–78 (discussing customary law obligations to prevent or
control transboundary harm and to cooperate in doing so).
99. See DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
POLICY 1050–54 (4th ed. 2011) (noting that the moratorium took effect in
1986).
100. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946,
art. VIII, 161 U.N.T.S. 72.
101. See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 99, at 1058–59.
102. See Editorial, Japan Is Back in the Hunt for Whales, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
29, 2014, at SR8; see also HUNTER ET AL., supra note 99, at 1059 (“[E]very
IWC meeting adopts a resolution condemning [Japan’s] practice.”).
103. See Daniel Bodansky, Legitimacy, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 704, 720 (Daniel Bodansky et al. eds.,
2007).
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104

ronment. Such concerns led researchers to impose a volun105
tary moratorium on further research. The purpose of the
moratorium was to preserve the status quo while the scientific
community undertook a more considered evaluation of the new
106
technology and its risks. That evaluation took place at the
1975 Asilomar Conference, where an international gathering of
scientists developed recommendations designed to address the
107
potential hazards of rDNA experiments. Deeming societal
concerns to be adequately addressed, the scientists ended the
research moratorium. The Asilomar recommendations subsequently proved influential, serving as the foundation for gov108
ernment guidelines on publicly funded rDNA research.
Although the Asilomar recommendations enabled rDNA
research to proceed, the effort offers a flawed model for governing research in an emerging technology. The Asilomar conference involved a limited range of participants, predominantly
109
scientists who favored moving forward with research. Moreover, the scope of discussions was narrow, focusing on technical
110
Discussions largely omitted
issues of risk management.
broader societal concerns as well as ethical and legal issues because their consideration was seen as “premature” and “specu111
lative.” Asilomar was viewed as a success at the time, but its
failure to incorporate the public and its concerns at an early
stage of technology development contributed to a resistance to
112
biotechnology that continues today. Geoengineering researchers interested in proceeding with field experiments would do

104. See Paul Berg et al., Potential Biohazards of Recombinant DNA Molecules, 185 SCIENCE 303, 303 (1974) (“There is serious concern that some of
these artificial recombinant DNA molecules could prove biologically hazardous.”).
105. See id.
106. See Paul Berg & Maxine F. Singer, The Recombinant DNA Controversy: Twenty Years Later, 92 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 9011, 9011 (1995).
107. See ALBERT C. LIN, PROMETHEUS REIMAGINED: TECHNOLOGY, ENVIRONMENT, AND LAW IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 52–53 (2013).
108. See id. at 54.
109. See Paul Berg, Meetings That Changed the World: Asilomar 1975, NATURE (Sept. 18, 2008), http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v455/n7211/
full/455290a.html (“[M]ost researchers, like me, acknowledged that the new
technology opened extraordinary avenues for genetics and could ultimately
lead to extraordinary opportunities in medicine, agriculture, and industry.”).
110. See LIN, supra note 107, at 53.
111. Berg & Singer, supra note 106, at 9012.
112. See LIN, supra note 107, at 72, 78.
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well to be more inclusive and more sensitive to non-technical
concerns.
Another illustration of self-guided oversight comes from
the governance of genetics research and research involving
human subjects. Such research is often subject to domestic laws
and restrictions, but at the international level, soft law devel113
oped by expert bodies predominates. The leading code of ethical principles for medical research involving human subjects is
114
the Declaration of Helsinki. Developed by the World Medical
Association and aimed at securing respect for individuals and
115
their right to make informed decisions, the Declaration encourages physicians to conduct research under the oversight of
independent research committees and with the informed con116
sent of research subjects. The Declaration provides an example of voluntary, self-governing oversight analogous to the
measures that rDNA researchers adopted at Asilomar and is
subject to similar limitations and critiques.
Geoengineering research governance might also draw lessons from beyond international environmental law. Perhaps
the most obvious examples of international restrictions on research involve biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Each
of these dual use technologies relies on skills, information, and
equipment that may be used for both peaceful and military
117
purposes, complicating efforts to restrict weapons research.
Determining the actual or primary purpose of research is rarely
straightforward, and perhaps futile when a technology can be
readily converted from peaceful to military use.
The experience of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention
(BWC) illustrates some of the difficulties of regulating research
for dual use technologies. The BWC forbids parties from developing, producing, stockpiling, or acquiring biological weap113. Reynolds, supra note 46.
114. WORLD MED. ASS’N, DECLARATION OF HELSINKI—ETHICAL PRINCIPLES FOR MEDICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS (2013), http://
www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/b3 [hereinafter DECLARATION OF
HELSINKI]; see Soren Holm, Declaration of Helsinki, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICS 1232 (Hugh La Follette ed., 2013) (describing the Declaration as “an important normative document in international discussions
about research ethics,” despite the fact that the World Medical Association is
only an umbrella organization for medical associations across the world).
115. DECLARATION OF HELSINKI, supra note 114, at arts. 7–9, 25–32.
116. Id. at arts. 2, 23; see Holm, supra note 114.
117. See David P. Fidler, International Law and Weapons of Mass Destruction: End of the Arms Control Approach?, 14 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 39, 66
(2004).
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118

ons. However, the treaty allows research for defensive purposes even though it “can involve pathogens and technologies
that may be little different from the work needed to develop of119
The treaty lacks a verification system,
fensive weapons.”
moreover. Parties were unable to agree on a mechanism for distinguishing between prohibited research aimed at developing
120
offensive weapons and other, permissible biological research.
In the absence of a verification mechanism, Iraq and the former
Soviet Union have committed substantial violations of the trea121
ty’s provisions, calling into question the treaty’s effectiveness.
The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) similarly
forbids parties from developing, producing, stockpiling, or ac122
quiring chemical weapons. In contrast to the BWC, the CWC
incorporates a detailed verification system that includes
123
recordkeeping and inspection requirements. While this verification system promises to make the CWC more effective than
the BWC, the potential for dual use remains. For instance,
those chemicals most susceptible to weapons use are generally
prohibited, but parties may still produce and use such chemi124
cals for research purposes. In addition, technological advances in neuroscience and nanotechnology that offer potential ben-

118. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their
Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, art. I, 26 U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163 (emphasis
added).
119. Leonard S. Spector, Slowing Proliferation: Why Legal Tools Matter, 34
VT. L. REV. 619, 621 (2010).
120. See id. at 620–21. In rejecting a draft protocol that would have established a verification regime, the United States explained that detecting violations would be nearly impossible because of the potential dual use of biological
weapon components. John R. Bolton, Under Secretary for Arms Control and
International Security, Remarks at the Tokyo America Center: The U.S. Position on the Biological Weapons Convention: Combating the BW Threat (Aug.
26, 2002), http://2001-2009.state.gov/t/us/rm/13090.htm.
121. See Fidler, supra note 117, at 63–64.
122. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993,
art. I.1, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-219, 1974 U.N.T.S. 317 (emphasis added).
123. Annex on Implementation and Verification, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical
Weapons and on Their Destruction, opened for signature Jan. 13, 1993, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 103-21, 1974 U.N.T.S. 317 [hereinafter CWC Verification Annex]; see also Timothy K. Webster, The Future of the Chemical and Biological
Weapons Conventions, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 187, 188–90 (2002) (discussing verification scheme).
124. CWC Verification Annex, supra note 123, pt. VI.
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efits for medical treatment also may find application in new
125
chemical weapons.
Nuclear technology presents further dual use challenges.
Under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
states without nuclear weapons pledge not to manufacture or
126
acquire such weapons. In exchange, these states receive as127
sistance in developing peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Indeed, the treaty explicitly recognizes “the inalienable right of
all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production
128
and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.” The nuclear
activities of non-nuclear-weapon states are subject to inspection
to ensure that the activities are only for peaceful purposes, and
noncompliance can prompt a referral to the U.N. Security
129
Council. The treaty’s monitoring and enforcement provisions
are relatively detailed and forceful, but implementation has
130
sometimes proved difficult. As with the BWC and CWC, deliberate skirting of treaty provisions has revealed the difficulty
of administering prohibitions that hinge on determining an ac131
tivity’s purpose. Most notoriously, Iran has undertaken uranium enrichment and plutonium production for apparent mili132
tary purposes while asserting peaceful intentions.
Each of the just-discussed weapons regulatory regimes distinguishes between prohibited and permitted research based on

125. Alistair Burt, We Must Wake Up to the Threats of New Chemical
Weapons, NEW SCIENTIST (Apr. 15, 2013) http://www.newscientist.com/article/
mg21829125.900-we-must-wake-up-to-the-threats-of-new-chemical-weapons
.html.
126. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, art.
II, T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 21 U.S.T. 483. Other treaties governing nuclear weapons
research include the Partial Test-Ban Treaty, which bans nuclear weapons
tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water, and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which has not entered into force. Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Sept. 24, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-28
(1997), 35 I.L.M. 1439; Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons in the Atmosphere,
in Outer Space, and Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, 480 U.N.T.S.
43.
127. Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 126, at
art. V.
128. Id. at art. IV.1.
129. Id. at art. III.1.
130. Joseph Cirincione, Enforcing Compliance with the Non-Proliferation
Treaty, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE (Mar. 24, 2005), http://
carnegieendowment.org/2005/03/24/enforcing-compliance-with-non
-proliferation-treaty.
131. Id.
132. Spector, supra note 119, at 624–25.
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the purpose of such research. The challenges of implementing
these regimes offer several cautionary points for prospective
geoengineering governance. A ban on research having a specific
purpose will incentivize efforts to disguise the true purpose of
otherwise prohibited research projects. Restrictions on research
may require verification mechanisms to be effective. And much
technical
knowledge,
including
that
produced
by
geoengineering research, has dual use potential.
II. EXISTING PROPOSALS TO GOVERN
GEOENGINEERING RESEARCH—AND WHAT’S MISSING
FROM THEM
The deadlock on geoengineering research—and the corresponding need to establish some form of governance for
133
geoengineering research—is widely acknowledged. Various
commentators have set forth governance proposals ranging
from self-regulation to formal international oversight. A survey
of these proposals identifies common elements and functions,
and also reveals a shared neglect of systemic concerns.
A. EXISTING PROPOSALS
1. Overview of Selected Proposals
A “widespread but quietly expressed” view in the
geoengineering community advocates that governance of
geoengineering research be left to ordinary scientific research
governance processes, with no additional oversight by govern134
ment or other actors. Drawing on conventional notions of scientific freedom, this view assumes that peer review, scientific
community norms, and existing regulations will adequately account for risks and other concerns. However, this view is not
universally held, even among scientists, and is often overshadowed by declarations calling for closer scrutiny and broader
135
participation in governance. Leading proposals for govern-

133. See Bellamy, supra note 51, at 21.
134. Parson & Keith, supra note 16; see Cicerone, supra note 46, at 223,
225 (urging that geoengineering research proceed as “on any other scientific
problem at least for theoretical and modeling studies,” while suggesting a
moratorium “on large-scale field manipulations”).
135. See, e.g., Schäfer et al., supra note 20 (describing a letter to the editor
noting that proposals for field testing generally “acknowledge a need for some
form of governance”); Karen N. Scott, International Law in the Anthropocene:
Responding to the Geoengineering Challenge, 35 MICH. J. INT’L LAW 309, 355
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ance of geoengineering research generally incorporate a wide
range of actors, including national governments or international organizations. Underlying these proposals is a recognition
that geoengineering research differs from basic scientific research in important ways that warrant additional external
oversight. For one, large-scale field experiments, which might
ultimately be necessary to assess effectiveness and risks, could
affect millions of people. For another, the primary aim of
geoengineering research is to develop and implement specific
technologies. If undertaken without sufficient oversight and accountability, such goal-directed research could unwittingly
commit the global community to an undesirable course of action.
Perhaps the foremost effort to focus attention on the specific issue of governing geoengineering research is the Solar Radi136
ation Management Governance Initiative (SRMGI). As its
name suggests, the SRMGI concentrates on SRM, and its initial purpose was “to develop specific governance recommenda137
tions for SRM research.” However, the initiative has since
modified its orientation toward “open[ing] up” discussions of
SRM governance by exploring and recording different perspectives, rather than preemptively “closing down” discussions and
138
producing definitive prescriptions.
In 2011, the SRMGI organized a conference to explore the
139
challenges raised by SRM research. Although organizers disclaimed any effort to reach a consensus, a summary report
identified general governance considerations, including possible
140
functions and alternative approaches. The report suggested
categorizing research into five groups according to potential
risk: (1) computer and desk studies involving no potential environmental impact; (2) laboratory studies or passive observations of nature; (3) small field trials having no significant large
scale effects; (4) medium and large-scale field trials; and (5) de-

(2013) (contending that self-regulation “does not represent an appropriate
governance mechanism”).
136. See SOLAR RADIATION MGMT. GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE, supra note 46,
at 11. The SRMGI is an ongoing partnership between the Royal Society, Environmental Defense Fund, and The World Academy of Science (TWAS). See id.
at 7.
137. Id. at 12.
138. Id. at 12, box 1.1.
139. See id. at 11–12.
140. Id. at 29–44.
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141

ployment. The report characterized the first three categories
as involving “negligible direct risk” and the latter two catego142
ries as involving “potentially direct risk.” While noting that
physical risk is “not the only consideration” relevant to governance, the report described general agreement among conference
participants on the need for “differentiated governance ar143
rangements for different kinds of SRM activity.” A more limited approach might increase oversight in proportion to the
physical risks of research, whereas a more proactive approach
might consider more broadly the indirect risks of research and
“pursue early progress towards a more comprehensive govern144
ance framework.”
The SRMGI has refrained from advocating a specific proposal for geoengineering research governance, but others have
not. Proposals vary in their details but frequently contain the
following elements: a coordinating role for governments, a government advisory committee on geoengineering research, a
moratorium on some or all field experiments, a permitting system to govern allowed field experiments, and compensation for
harms.
Governments could take an active role in organizing or
promoting geoengineering research, as some proposals advo145
cate. Government leadership would address concerns that
current research is insufficient or poorly prioritized. On a national basis, governments can coordinate existing research, set
research priorities, and help ensure that policymakers make in146
formed decisions. Internationally, cost-sharing arrangements
or cooperative research programs can stimulate national spend147
ing and promote more cost-effective research. International
cooperation can also coordinate field experiments so that they
148
do not interfere with one another. More generally, formal
141. Id. at 25–26. The report recognized that SRM research activities could
be organized in other ways, but explained that the categorization described
above was used and developed in conference discussions and “has the advantages of being clear, accessible, and reflecting the full range of potential
SRM research activities.” Id. at 25, 27.
142. See id. at 26.
143. Id. at 25, 27.
144. Id. at 55.
145. See Bodansky, supra note 21, at 546.
146. See GAO-10-903, supra note 61, at 39; GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 52, at 55.
147. See Bodansky, supra note 21, at 546.
148. See BODLE ET AL., supra note 21, at 128.
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government involvement can provide legitimacy to research activities, which might otherwise be perceived as rogue experi149
ments.
Under several proposals, an advisory committee on
geoengineering research would provide expert advice to gov150
ernments regarding oversight, policies, and practices. A 2011
proposal from the Bipartisan Policy Center’s (BPC) Task Force
on Climate Remediation Research advocates a committee to
provide advice on setting up an adequate research program,
regulating the risks of field experiments, and conducting public
151
outreach. This proposal takes the perspective that present research efforts are an insufficient response to climate change
and thus anticipates “little, if any, special scrutiny on a project152
by-project basis” for “low-risk early research.” Another proposal for an advisory committee, from David E. Winickoff and
Mark B. Brown, urges a generally more cautious approach than
the BPC. Winickoff and Brown’s proposed advisory committee
would “provide detailed advice to the Executive Branch and
government agencies on an oversight framework before the con153
ception and funding of geoengineering research.” Emphasizing the importance of developing trusted institutions and procedures for addressing this controversial subject, Winickoff and
Brown describe “promot[ion of] public deliberation and debate
about values and goals” as a critical function of their proposed
154
committee.
A moratorium on some or all field experiments is an element of many proposals. Edward A. Parson and David W. Keith
suggest, for example, distinguishing between projects based on
two thresholds of scale and risk: geoengineering projects and
field experiments beyond a “large” threshold would be subject
149. See Bodansky, supra note 21, at 546.
150. In addition to the proposals discussed above, see Jane C.S. Long &
Dane Scott, Vested Interests and Geoengineering Research, ISSUES SCI. &
TECH., 2013, at 45, 45–52 (suggesting that an independent advisory board
could develop standards and norms for transparency and research management), and Parson & Ernst, supra note 32, at 335 (suggesting a “World Commission on Climate Engineering” to advise governments and international organizations, elicit stakeholder and citizen input, and undertake other tasks).
151. BPC, supra note 52, at 19.
152. Id. at 20.
153. Winickoff & Brown, supra note 5, at 83 (emphasis added). In contrast,
another proposal would insist on a governance framework as a precondition
only for field research outside an “‘allowed zone’ of experimental parameters
and expected effects.” Morgan et al., supra note 51, at 37, 41.
154. Winickoff & Brown, supra note 5, at 84.
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to a moratorium, whereas field experiments below a “smallscale” threshold would be allowed to proceed if they comply
with transparency requirements and environmental, health,
155
and safety rules. Parson and Keith sidestep the issue of how
to govern experiments falling between these two thresholds and
focus instead on creating operating space for small, low-risk research. To that end, they contend the proposed moratorium
should “be long and firm enough to allay concern that small re156
search will slide unexamined into deployment.” Other commentators urge a broader moratorium on all field testing to allow further public deliberation on geoengineering to occur
157
first.
Various proposals also include a permitting system or some
other form of external control. Some proposals would require a
158
permit for all geoengineering field experiments, whereas others would require a permit only for experiments exceeding spec159
ified thresholds of scale or risk. Permitting is commonly contemplated at the national level, but international oversight for
field experiments having international significance or
160
transboundary effects is also possible. A permit requirement
155. Parson & Keith, supra note 16, at 1279. Overall, Parson and Keith
recommend that research be subject to governance “backed by government authority and coordinated internationally,” perhaps through “informal consultation and coordinated decisions by research-funding and regulatory agencies of
participating governments.” Id.; cf. Ian D. Lloyd & Michael Oppenheimer, On
the Design of an International Governance Framework for Geoengineering,
GLOBAL ENVTL. POL., May 2014, at 45, 53–57 (proposing a similar approach in
which small-scale experiments would be frequently permitted, large-scale experiments with potential transboundary effects would be banned initially but
occasionally permitted as knowledge increases, and large-scale deployment
would be permitted only with consensus approval).
156. Parson & Keith, supra note 16, at 1279.
157. See ETC GRP., GEOPIRACY: THE CASE AGAINST GEOENGINEERING 40
(2010) (urging a moratorium “on all geoengineering activities outside the laboratory” “[u]ntil there has been a full debate on the course all countries wish
to go”); Clive Hamilton, No, We Should Not Just “At Least Do the Research,”
496 NATURE 139, 139 (2013) (identifying various questions to be answered before further research is undertaken); Michael Zürn & Stefan Schäfer, The
Paradox of Climate Engineering, 4 GLOBAL POL’Y 266, 274 (2013) (proposing a
“time-limited moratorium” on field testing).
158. See, e.g., BODLE ET AL., supra note 21, at 142.
159. See, e.g., Parson & Ernst, supra note 32, at 326; cf. ROYAL SOC’Y, supra note 28, at 41 (contending “[t]here is a clear need for governance of research involving large-scale field testing,” without specifying the form such
governance might take).
160. See HOUSE OF COMMONS SCI. & TECH. COMM., THE REGULATION OF
GEOENGINEERING 38 (2010) (U.K.) (suggesting that “small tests of SRM
geoengineering” having negligible or predictable environmental impacts and
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can ensure prior assessment, mitigation, and monitoring of a
161
field experiment’s environmental impacts. Such a requirement would build on actions already taken under the LC/LP
162
and CBD. As noted above, the permitting contemplated under
the LC/LP is limited to scientific research on ocean fertilization
163
and other marine geoengineering techniques. Meanwhile, the
decision by the CBD parties allows for small-scale scientific research studies “conducted in a controlled setting,” but does
164
nothing to establish a permitting scheme.
Finally, some proposals suggest the creation of a liability
and compensation system to address harms that might result
165
from field experiments. Geoengineering deployment raises li166
ability concerns most pointedly, but field experiments also
could have adverse environmental consequences warranting
167
compensation. Designing a compensation system would require the resolution of difficult questions of harm, causation,
168
and responsibility.
no transboundary effects be allowed if in accordance with internationally accepted principles, and that larger scale tests be regulated).
161. See Resolution LP.4(8), supra note 82, annex 4, at 8; Parson & Ernst,
supra note 32, at 327.
162. See Till Markus & Harald Ginzky, Regulating Climate Engineering:
Paradigmatic Aspects of the Regulation of Ocean Fertilization, 4 CARBON &
CLIMATE L. REV. 477, 484–86 (2011) (discussing how assessment framework
for evaluating ocean fertilization experiments could serve as a model for other
geoengineering regulatory efforts).
163. Resolution LP.4(8), supra note 82.
164. Decision by the Parties to the CBD, supra note 87, ¶ 8(w).
165. See Joshua B. Horton et al., Liability for Solar Geoengineering: Historical Precedents, Contemporary Innovations, and Governance Possibilities, 22
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 225, 237–45 (2015); Parson & Ernst, supra note 32, at 326;
Jesse L. Reynolds, An Economic Analysis of Liability and Compensation for
Harm from Large-Scale Field Research in Solar Climate Engineering, 5 CLIMATE L. 182, 192–202 (2015).
166. See, e.g., Toby Svoboda & Peter J. Irvine, Ethical and Technical Challenges in Compensating for Harm Due to Solar Radiation Management
Geoengineering, 17 ETHICS POL’Y & ENV’T 157 (2014); Joshua B. Horton et al.,
Solar Geoengineering and the Problem of Liability, GEOENGINEERING OUR
CLIMATE? (Nov. 19, 2013), http://geoengineeringourclimate.files.wordpress
.com/2013/11/horton-et-al-2013-solar-geoengineering-and-the-problem-of
-liability-click-for-download.pdf; Pak-Hang Wong et al., Compensation for
Geoengineering Harms and No-Fault Climate Change Compensation (Climate
Geoengineering Governance Working Paper Series, Paper No. 003, 2014),
http://geoengineering-governance-research.org/perch/resources/
workingpaper8wongdouglassavulescucompensationfinal-.pdf.
167. See Dilling & Hauser, supra note 20, at 557.
168. See id.; Parson & Ernst, supra note 32, at 326; Svoboda & Irvine, supra note 166, at 161–70.
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2. Existing Proposals Focus on Physical Risks
Viewed collectively, existing proposals for governing
169
geoengineering research focus on physical risks. This focus is
apparent from what these proposals do—and do not—contain.
First, no proposals call for oversight of indoor research. Such
research poses virtually no threat of physical harm, and its
170
regulation in any case is politically unlikely. Second, proposals to regulate field experiments generally tailor the amount
of scrutiny to the scale of the experiment and expected ef171
fects. The most stringent oversight would correspond to experiments posing the greatest potential physical risk, whereas
experiments posing little potential physical risk would likely
escape oversight altogether. The scope of proposed moratoria on
field experiments further illustrates the emphasis on physical
risk. For instance, Parson and Keith’s proposed moratorium
would apply only to those field experiments whose effects surpass defined thresholds of damage or risk. In sum, each of these features reflects a desire to strike a balance between the information that field tests might offer and the environmental
172
harm that may result.
Undoubtedly, the physical risks of geoengineering warrant
substantial attention. Ocean fertilization could wreak havoc on
173
The release of stratospheric aerosols
marine ecosystems.

169. Cf. Rob Bellamy, Beyond Climate Control: “Opening Up” Propositions
for Geoengineering Governance (Climate Geoengineering Governance Working
Paper Series, Paper No. 11, 2014), http://www.geoengineering-governance
-research.org/perch/resources/workingpaper11bellamybeyondclimatecontrol
.pdf (observing that geoengineering appraisals “have largely taken the form of
reductive ‘expert-analytic’ approaches such as computer modelling, costbenefit analysis, expert review and multi-criteria analysis that treat the issue
as one of simple ‘risk’ rather than one of indeterminate uncertainty, ambiguity
or ignorance” (internal citations omitted)).
170. See, e.g., HOUSE OF COMMONS SCI. & TECH. COMM., supra note 160, at
37.
171. Cf. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 13 (recommending
that research governance “consider the need for increasing supervision as the
scope and scale of the research and its potential implications increase”).
172. See Parsons & Ernst, supra note 32, at 328 (contending that governance decisions “must have a substantially scientific character” because
“[d]ecisions whether to authorize proposed research interventions will need to
be informed by judgments of their scientific promise and the balance between
the knowledge they offer and the scale of environmental disruption they impose”).
173. See ROYAL SOC’Y, supra note 28, at 17–18; Mary W. Silver et al., Toxic
Diatoms and Domoic Acid in Natural and Iron Enriched Waters of the Oceanic
Pacific, 107 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 20762, at 20763–64 (2010).
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could interfere with monsoon patterns and exacerbate depletion
174
of the ozone layer. Similarly, enhancing cloud albedo could al175
ter regional precipitation and temperature patterns. Thanks
to the uncertainties associated with individual geoengineering
techniques and the Earth’s climate systems, other, as-yet unanticipated physical risks also may emerge. Moreover, physical
risks are not confined to full-scale deployment. Field experiments, too, may be of sufficient scale or effect to present significant physical hazards, thereby warranting concern and close
scrutiny.
Physical risks are not the only concerns that
geoengineering research raises, however. Transparency and
public deliberation—or a lack thereof—are two concerns that
some
geoengineering
research
governance
proposals
acknowledge as well. Potential mechanisms to foster transparency include education, media outreach, and a public registry
that would give advance notice of geoengineering field trials
176
and disclose research results. Mechanisms to engage the public in decision making, as opposed to merely providing information, might include discussion groups, citizen panels, or pub177
lic comment processes. The principles of transparency and dedeliberation feature prominently in the Oxford Principles, a
widely cited set of general principles for geoengineering governance. With respect to transparency, the Oxford Principles
encourage “complete disclosure of research plans and open pub178
lication of results.” And to promote public deliberation, the
174. See ROYAL SOC’Y, supra note 28, at 31; Simone Tilmes et al., The Sensitivity of Polar Ozone Depletion to Proposed Geoengineering Schemes, 320
SCIENCE 1201, 1203–04 (2008).
175. See ROYAL SOC’Y, supra note 28, at 28; John Latham et al., Global
Temperature Stabilization Via Controlled Albedo Enhancement of Low-Level
Maritime Clouds, 366 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A 3969, 3982–83
(2008).
176. See Dilling & Hauser, supra note 20, at 559; Parson & Keith, supra
note 16, at 1279; see also BPC, supra note 52, at 14 (recommending development of “transparency protocols for all potentially risky forms of climate remediation research”); Morgan et al., supra note 51, at 42 (recommending a
code of best practices that would include a commitment to publicize SRM research activities on a common website).
177. See Dilling & Hauser, supra note 20, at 559–60; see also Winickoff &
Brown, supra note 5, at 84 (suggesting that a proposed government advisory
committee promote public deliberation regarding geoengineering goals).
178. Rayner et al., supra note 56, at 503; cf. ASILOMAR SCI. ORG. COMM.,
THE ASILOMAR CONFERENCE RECOMMENDATIONS ON PRINCIPLES FOR RESEARCH INTO CLIMATE ENGINEERING TECHNIQUES 9 (2010) (recommending
that geoengineering research “be conducted openly and cooperatively,” with
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principles counsel that “those conducting geoengineering research . . . be required to notify, consult, and ideally obtain the
prior informed consent of, those affected by the research activi179
ties.”
B. WHAT’S MISSING: OTHER CONCERNS RAISED BY RESEARCH
Ensuring that geoengineering field experiments do not
present unacceptable physical risks is essential, as is informing
and engaging the public regarding such experiments that do
occur. Geoengineering research governance proposals typically
seek to address these concerns on a project-by-project basis.
Through the review of individual field experiments, society presumably can guard against physical harm to humans or the environment. A review process for individual experiments also
would provide a concrete setting for implementing measures to
promote transparency and public engagement.
Merely attending to physical risks and providing avenues
for public participation are not sufficient, however. Existing
governance proposals largely fail to address the big-picture
concerns geoengineering research raises. I refer to these concerns as systemic concerns, as they arise from the sum of
geoengineering research efforts rather than any individual experiment. Systemic concerns are apparent in the public response to the SPICE project—which engaged stakeholders and
posed virtually no physical risks yet triggered pointed opposi180
tion. The public, sensitive to the project’s significance within
a broader developmental trajectory, worries that such research
will lead society down a slippery slope to deployment. The slippery slope concern and the related phenomenon of technological
lock-in are not the only systemic concerns associated with
geoengineering research. Other systemic concerns include the
potential for geoengineering to undermine mitigation efforts
(often referred to as a “moral hazard”), and the heightened prospects for military conflict as geoengineering experimentation
and deployment proceed. Ultimately, research does not produce
knowledge in a vacuum; rather, it alters the context in which

“[p]ublic participation and consultation in research planning and oversight”);
BPC, supra note 52, at 14 (identifying transparency as an important basic
principle that should govern geoengineering research).
179. Rayner et al., supra note 56, at 502.
180. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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society makes policy decisions and may predispose society to
181
particular courses of action.
1. Lock-in
Through its co-evolution with social, institutional, cultural,
and political systems, a technology can become dominant and
182
difficult to dislodge, or “locked in.” Lock-in often results not
from obvious technical superiority but rather from processes of
path-dependence. Self-reinforcing processes can amplify minor
but early advantages or chance circumstances into subsequent
183
dominance. Specifically, a technology may benefit from economic factors such as economies of scale, learning effects, and
184
other positive feedback processes. Political and social factors
also may contribute to lock-in, as politicians, agencies, firms,
and other parties become invested in establishing and perpetu185
ating a particular technology, and as social paradigms and
186
everyday practices contribute to a technology’s acceptance.
To some degree, lock-in is a necessary and unavoidable fea187
ture of innovation. Sizable investments and commitments are

181. See Rayner et al., supra note 56, at 502 (“These considerations suggest
that the issue of social control over the technologies is vital in deciding whether to proceed with geoengineering research. Public resistance to new technology is seldom only about the probability of death or physical injury from a technology.”).
182. See Ivan Scrase & Gordon MacKerron, Lock-In, in ENERGY FOR THE
FUTURE: A NEW AGENDA 89, 90 (Ivan Scrase & Gordon MacKerron eds., 2009);
see also Rose C. Cairns, Climate Geoengineering: Issues of Path-Dependence
and Socio-Technical Lock-In, 5 WIRES CLIMATE CHANGE 649, 650–51 (2014).
183. See Cairns, supra note 182, at 650.
184. See id.; Scrase & MacKerron, supra note 182, at 91; see also W. Brian
Arthur, Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Historical Events, 99 ECON. J. 116, 116 (1989) (“Modern, complex technologies often
display increasing returns to adoption in that the more they are adopted, the
more experience is gained with them, and the more they are improved.”).
Learning effects refer to product improvements and cost reductions resulting
from the accumulation of specialized skills and knowledge. See Timothy J.
Foxon, Technological Lock-In and the Role of Innovation, in HANDBOOK OF
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 140, 142 (Giles Atkinson et al. eds., 2007).
185. See Scrase & MacKerron, supra note 182, at 90, 94. Policies, regulatory frameworks, and political institutions can be resistant to change because of
high start-up costs, complex and opaque interactions, and the ability to use
political authority to enhance one’s own power. See Foxon, supra note 184, at
144.
186. See Cairns, supra note 182, at 650.
187. See William Walker, Entrapment in Large Technology Systems: Institutional Commitment and Power Relations, 29 RES. POL’Y 833, 834, 846
(2000).
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essential for technologies to take root. Society faces a fundamental dilemma in deciding whether to adopt an emerging
technology, however, because its negative consequences often
are not known or salient at the outset. Once a technology is
locked in, those consequences can be difficult to avoid or ad188
dress. The unavoidable delay in identifying a technology’s adverse effects undermines rational decision making. A technology may achieve dominance not because it is optimal, but
because it possessed an initial competitive advantage. As a result, “the unfit can attract huge investment and can survive
189
long after they should have been sent to the grave.”
Global dependence on fossil fuel-based energy systems pro190
vides a straightforward illustration of lock-in. Existing energy systems are deeply resistant to change because of their longlived and extensive infrastructure, as well as their complex and
191
interrelated components. In addition, these systems are operated by powerful stakeholders whose interests are tied to per192
petuating the status quo. As a result of lock-in, fuel use in future decades “is already determined by investment decisions
193
made over the last decade and more.” Rapid and widespread
adoption of alternative energy systems to mitigate climate
change or reduce fossil fuel dependence is difficult, if not impossible.
Although economists developed the concept of lock-in to
explain the dominance of inferior technologies in competitive
194
markets, the concept can apply in other contexts as well. In
geoengineering policy discussions, lock-in refers to a variety of
concerns—social and cognitive—regarding premature and
suboptimal commitments to one or more geoengineering tech-

188. DAVID COLLINGRIDGE, THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF TECHNOLOGY 16–19
(1980); Cairns, supra note 182, at 650.
189. Walker, supra note 187, at 834.
190. See Gregory C. Unruh, Understanding Carbon Lock-In, 28 ENERGY
POL’Y 817, 818 (2000); see also Simon Shackley & Michael Thompson, Lost in
the Mix: Will the Technologies of Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage Provide
Us with a Breathing Space As We Strive To Make the Transition from Fossil
Fuels to Renewables?, 110 CLIMATIC CHANGE 101, 103–12 (2012) (discussing a
concern that carbon capture and storage will reinforce carbon lock-in).
191. See Albert C. Lin, Lessons from the Past for Assessing Energy Technologies for the Future, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1814, 1820 (2014).
192. See id.
193. Scrase & MacKerron, supra note 182, at 95.
194. See Arthur, supra note 184, at 126–27 (suggesting adoption of the
QWERTY typewriter keyboard and other examples).
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195

Social lock-in describes the concern that some
niques.
geoengineering technologies would require sizable capital investments and physical infrastructure and thus foster the crea196
tion of vested interests in their continuation. Even substantial research into a specific technique could create scientific and
commercial interests favoring further research and perhaps
197
Cognitive lock-in characterizes the worry
implementation.
that the social framing of geoengineering can conceal value
judgments
and
unduly
influence
assessments
of
198
For example, a focus on certain
geoengineering.
geoengineering proposals could prematurely foreclose consideration of other geoengineering options. The disproportionate attention currently being devoted to stratospheric aerosols is of
199
particular concern. More generally, the discussion of any
geoengineering technique could steer attention away from nongeoengineering alternatives for responding to climate change—
200
a moral hazard concern discussed below. Further, the mere
study of geoengineering could even make its deployment more
201
likely. Thus, one report on SRM worries that “[e]ven very
basic and safe research . . . could be a first step onto a ‘slippery
slope,’” creating momentum and a scientific lobbying constitu202
ency for development and eventual deployment.

195. See Cairns, supra note 182, at 651. In addition to the lock-in concerns
associated with geoengineering research discussed above, deployment of
geoengineering raises a further lock-in concern regarding the drastic climate
consequences of terminating an SRM scheme once it has been in place. See infra text accompanying notes 329–30.
196. See Cairns, supra note 182, at 651. David Keith, a leading proponent
of field research on stratospheric aerosol release, acknowledges institutional
lock-in to be a “strong argument” against experiments posing little risk. See
KEITH, supra note 34, at 151.
197. See David R. Morrow et al., Toward Ethical Norms and Institutions
for Climate Engineering Research, 4 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS, Oct. 2009, at 3.
198. See Rob Bellamy et al., A Review of Climate Geoengineering Appraisals, 3 WIRES CLIMATE CHANGE 597, 610–11 (2012); Cairns, supra note 182, at
651–52.
199. See Bellamy et al., supra note 198, at 608.
200. See id. at 609. Bellamy et al. further caution that the contextual framing of geoengineering as a response to a climate emergency could “artificially
enhance the perceived acceptability of geoengineering proposals.” Id.
201. See Cairns, supra note 182, at 652.
202. SOLAR RADIATION MGMT. GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE, supra note 46, at
21.
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2. Moral Hazard
Geoengineering research presents a second systemic concern, commonly referred to as moral hazard. Geoengineering
can offer no more than a partial response to climate change.
SRM techniques would “fail to precisely undo the environmental disruptions caused by elevated GHGs” and would do nothing to combat the ocean acidification that rising carbon levels
203
cause. CDR techniques would require intense and protracted
efforts to remove relatively modest amounts of carbon from the
204
atmosphere. Accordingly, even if geoengineering were to be
deployed, GHG emissions reductions (commonly referred to as
205
mitigation) would remain essential. In this context, moral
hazard refers to the potential for geoengineering research and
development activities to undermine mitigation efforts and
206
public support for such efforts. Specifically, geoengineering—
or the prospect of geoengineering—may divert attention and
resources away from mitigation, undermine incentives to reduce behaviors that generate carbon emissions, or encourage
207
political inaction. The moral hazard concern has both psychological and political components. Psychologically, people may
misperceive geoengineering as a simple yet comprehensive solution to climate change and thereby view mitigation as less
208
urgent or even unnecessary. The extent of this effect is open
to debate as an empirical matter, but psychological tendencies
203. See Parson & Ernst, supra note 32.
204. See Albert C. Lin, Does Geoengineering Present a Moral Hazard?, 40
ECOLOGY L.Q. 673, 676–77 (2013); Parson & Ernst, supra note 32, at 313 (discussing “low leverage” characteristics of CDR techniques).
205. Geoengineering researchers generally agree on this point. See, e.g.,
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 13; ROYAL SOC’Y, supra note 28, at
ix (“No geoengineering method can provide an easy or readily acceptable alternative solution to the problem of climate change.”); Martin Bunzl, Researching Geoengineering: Should Not or Could Not?, 4 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS, Oct.
2009, at 1, 2; Michael MacCracken et al., Asilomar International Conference
on Climate Intervention Technologies, Statement from the Conference’s Scientific Organizing Committee (Mar. 26, 2010), http://www.whoi.edu/fileserver
.do?id=62483&pt=10&p=39472.
206. See Lin, supra note 204, at 674; David R. Morrow, Ethical Aspects of
the Mitigation Obstruction Argument Against Climate Engineering Research,
372 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A, Nov. 17, 2014, at 2.
207. See Stefan Schäfer et al., Earth’s Future in the Anthropocene: Technological Interventions Between Piecemeal and Utopian Social Engineering, 2
EARTH’S FUTURE 239, 242 (2014). For a discussion regarding whether decreased mitigation would lead to a worse outcome, see Morrow, supra note
206, at 3–11.
208. See Lin, supra note 204, at 678.
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toward overconfidence and procrastination suggest its plausi209
bility. Politically, geoengineering might offer elected officials
an easy excuse for avoiding difficult choices that could impose
significant costs or require substantial changes in current life210
styles and the global economy. Why pay the price of mitigation today, politicians might contend, if a seemingly inexpensive technological fix lies just over the horizon?
Like lock-in, moral hazard is a systemic concern in that it
arises from the overall course of geoengineering research rather
than from any individual field trial. An ongoing research program, including advancing field experimentation, might offer
political cover for officials to sustain claims that a technological
fix is on the way and that mitigation is unnecessary.
3. Increased Conflict
Geoengineering research—especially research into the
faster-acting SRM techniques—raises a further systemic concern: the potential use of such techniques in military conflict.
The military, appreciating the importance of weather to battlefield success, has a deep and long-standing interest in weather
211
and climate control. It is thus not surprising that the U.S.
209. Compare Lin, supra note 204, at 694–701 (discussing psychological
influences on risk perception), with Jesse Reynolds, A Critical Examination of
the Climate Engineering Moral Hazard and Risk Compensation Concern, 2
ANTHROPOCENE REV. 174, 185 (2015) (arguing that empirical evidence of moral hazard and risk compensation is “not fully conclusive”).
210. See STEPHEN M. GARDINER, A PERFECT MORAL STORM: THE ETHICAL
TRAGEDY OF CLIMATE CHANGE 364 (2011) (warning that a policy of modest
geoengineering research, but not deployment, “is the approach most compatible with continued intergenerational buck-passing” because it would impose
minimal costs and risks to the present generation); Lin, supra note 204, at
707; Robert L. Olson, Soft Geoengineering: A Gentler Approach to Addressing
Climate Change, ENVIRONMENT, Sept./Oct. 2012, at 29, 30 (“Another key concern is that if politicians come to believe that geoengineering provides a lowcost ‘tech fix’ for climate change, it could give them a perfect excuse to back off
from efforts to cut emissions.”); Edward A. Parson, Reflections on Air Capture:
The Political Economy of Active Intervention in the Global Environment, 74
CLIMATIC CHANGE 5, 8 (2006).
211. See generally JAMES RODGER FLEMING, FIXING THE SKY: THE CHECKERED HISTORY OF WEATHER AND CLIMATE CONTROL 165–88 (2010) (detailing
military interest in cloud seeding, hurricane modification, and other forms of
weather modification). The ENMOD Convention prohibits the “military or any
other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having widespread,
long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury” to
other states. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile
Use of Environmental Modification Techniques art. I, opened for signature
May 18, 1977, 31 U.S.T. 333, 1108 U.N.T.S. 151.
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military has expressed interest in the subject of
212
Current geoengineering research has a
geoengineering.
peaceful aim of countering the effects of climate change, and it
is not at all certain that geoengineering-based applications
213
would have sufficient precision to be useful in war. Nonetheless, as experience with other dual-use technologies suggests,
the military might use the information generated from such re214
search to develop weapons and other wartime applications.
Geoengineering technologies with regional effects may be of
particular interest because of their potential for altering the
215
weather or climate of rival nations.
Aside from direct military applications, geoengineering research also could foster global conflict by creating a new bone of
geopolitical contention. For one, states might view another
country’s unilateral pursuit of geoengineering research as contrary to their interests and as a precursor to unilateral deploy216
ment. Field tests could heighten tensions or lead to preemptive strikes, and deployment could provoke retaliatory
217
measures. Moreover, even if geoengineering techniques were
successfully and peacefully developed, a slate of difficult if not
ungovernable issues regarding their potential deployment
would arise. The metaphor of a global thermostat, though misleading in the degree of control it suggests, captures some of
218
the likely conflict. Just as individuals may disagree over a
212. See Morrow et al., supra note 197.
213. See Achim Maas & Jürgen Scheffran, Climate Conflicts 2.0? Climate
Engineering as a Challenge for International Peace and Security, 20
SICHERHEIT & FRIEDEN 193, 196 (2012) (reasoning deliberate military use of
geoengineering is unlikely because of potential for large collateral damage,
time delay between deployment and results, and highly indirect effects); Steve
Rayner, To Know or Not To Know? A Note on Ignorance as a Rhetorical Resource in Geoengineering Debates 8 (Climate Geoengineering Governance
Working Paper Series, Paper No. 10, 2014), http://geoengineering-governance
-research.org/perch/resources/workingpaper10raynertoknowornottoknow-1.pdf
(noting tension between assertions that solar geoengineering is uncontrollable
and the high degree of control that successful weaponization would require).
214. See supra Part I.C (discussing the dual use of biological research for
offensive and medical purposes).
215. See Morrow et al., supra note 197; Robock, supra note 67, at 227.
216. See Adam Corner & Nick Pidgeon, Geoengineering the Climate: The
Social and Ethical Implications, ENVIRONMENT, Jan./Feb. 2010, at 24, 30.
217. See Bodansky, supra note 21, at 549 (suggesting that retaliation might
include measures to warm the climate back up).
218. See Albert Lin, Geoengineering’s Thermostat Dilemma, in THE LAW OF
THE FUTURE AND THE FUTURE OF LAW: VOLUME II 173–74 (Sam Muller et al.
eds., 2012).
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thermostat setting, nations may disagree over whether to deploy geoengineering at all; if so, when and how deployment
219
should occur; and how to make such decisions. If these issues
are inherently ungovernable, perhaps the prudent course would
be to avoid developing a technology that would only sow the
220
seeds of future conflict. Ignorance, in this instance, could be a
221
virtue.
A counterargument can be made, however, that ignorance
may not be an option if would-be geoengineering researchers
are determined to press forward. Furthermore, ignorance regarding a geoengineering technique or its risks might not pre222
vent poorly informed deployment. As climate change becomes
more severe, the international community or an individual nation might turn in desperation to an unproven geoengineering
technique. Such a move could lead to international disputes as
223
well as unexpected consequences. The critical premise underlying this argument is that research will yield adequate information to support prudent, consensus-based decision making.
Even if research is done, however, substantial uncertainties regarding the effects of possible climate interventions are likely
224
to remain. In any case, disagreements regarding how to proceed will persist, and research may create a false sense of secu225
rity that exacerbates such disagreements.

219. See MIKE HULME, CAN SCIENCE FIX CLIMATE CHANGE?: A CASE
AGAINST CLIMATE ENGINEERING 60 (2014); Lin, supra note 218, at 175; Phil
Macnaghten & Bronislaw Szerszynski, Living the Global Social Experiment:
An Analysis of Public Discourse on Solar Radiation Management and Its Implications for Governance, 23 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 465, 472 (2013); Parson
& Ernst, supra note 32, at 330.
220. Cf. HULME, supra note 219, at 81–82 (contending that stratospheric
aerosol deployment should not be researched if it cannot be governed in an acceptable manner).
221. See Rayner, supra note 213, at 12–13.
222. See, e.g., SOLAR RADIATION MGMT. GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE, supra
note 46, at 20.
223. See id. at 20–21.
224. See Rayner, supra note 213, at 7; Szerszynski et al., supra note 43, at
2811 (suggesting that SRM “[d]eployment will thus always have the character
of research”).
225. See Rayner, supra note 213, at 12–13 (describing such concern among
opponents of geoengineering research).
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III. A PROPOSAL FOR GEOENGINEERING RESEARCH
GOVERNANCE
Governance should address both the systemic concerns and
physical risks associated with geoengineering research. This
Part sketches out the desired characteristics of a research governance structure, surveys issues of governance design, and
then sets forth a specific proposal.
A. DESIRED CHARACTERISTICS OF RESEARCH GOVERNANCE
What characteristics should a geoengineering research
governance regime have? First, governance should be legitimate and perceived as such. Second, governance should effectively address the concerns raised by geoengineering research.
1. Legitimacy
Efforts by the scientific community and by nongovernmental institutions to develop governance mechanisms, however
well-intended, have been lacking in legitimacy. The SPICE field
experiment ran into trouble, but not for lack of conventional
scientific oversight. Indeed, the experiment was subject to review processes beyond those typically applied to university re226
search. This oversight nevertheless was perceived as inadequate to account for the broader social concerns surrounding
227
SRM. Laypersons questioned the experiment’s justification,
given the limited information the experiment would provide
228
and the subsequent research it seemed to presume. They also
voiced strong support for international regulatory structures to
229
shape this and any subsequent SRM field experiments. The
conflict-of-interest concerns that ultimately sank the experiment only underscore the need for external oversight that
would be widely accepted as legitimate.
The incorporation of various features—independence,
transparency, public participation, and accountability—all can
230
contribute to a governance structure’s legitimacy. Independ-

226. See Pidgeon et al., supra note 3 (discussing “Stagegate” evaluation
process, in which researchers were asked to satisfy five evaluation criteria,
including the description of future potential applications and impacts).
227. See id. at 454–55.
228. See id.
229. See id.
230. See BODLE ET AL., supra note 21, at 20; Rayner et al., supra note 56, at
505, 508; Winickoff & Brown, supra note 5, at 81 (“An advisory committee on
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ence requires that overseers make decisions in the public interest and free from the undue influence of researchers, research
231
sponsors, and private interests. Accordingly, individual researchers cannot be left to police themselves, and there should
be some form of external oversight. Even peer review by other
232
geoengineering researchers may not assure impartiality. Participation by geoengineering experts will be necessary to enable
informed oversight, but to ensure independence, a governing
institution should also include diverse perspectives and inter233
ests from outside the geoengineering research community.
Transparency is inherent to legitimacy in the sense that
openness demonstrates respect for the persons over whom
234
democratic authority is exercised. Equally important, transparency furthers legitimacy by exposing vested interests and
235
fostering public confidence in governance processes. To promote transparency, the public should have detailed notice of research plans in advance, as well as access to the information
236
generated by research. Transparency also should apply to research agendas: researchers and policy makers should explain
the role of individual research projects within their broader
237
context and communicate overall research goals. The technical nature of geoengineering demands special attention to
presenting information to the public in an understandable
238
Perhaps most importantly, governance processes
manner.
239
themselves should be transparent. Given the distrust that already attends geoengineering, a governance regime for

geoengineering will be more effective and legitimate to the extent that it is independent, transparent, deliberative, publicly engaged, and broadly framed.”).
231. See Winickoff & Brown, supra note 5, at 81.
232. See id. (warning that an expert institution, to avoid being seen as an
advocate for geoengineering deployment, must include people without direct
involvement in geoengineering research).
233. See id.
234. See Neil Craik & Nigel Moore, Disclosure-Based Governance for Climate Engineering Research 4 (Ctr. for Int’l Governance Innovation, CIGI Paper No. 50, 2014), https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/no.50.pdf.
235. See id. at 4–5; see also Winickoff & Brown, supra note 5, at 81.
236. See Dilling & Hauser, supra note 20, at 559 (recommending “public
registries that include information on funding sources, personnel, research
plans, project outcomes, etc.”).
237. Cf. Pidgeon et al., supra note 3, at 454 (characterizing communication
about research as “obligatory”).
238. See Dilling & Hauser, supra note 20, at 556–57.
239. See Parson & Keith, supra note 16, at 1279; Winickoff & Brown, supra
note 5, at 81.
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geoengineering research will command public confidence only if
the public can see how governance decisions are made.
Through public participation, persons affected by a deci240
sion can have a say in its making. Participation can advance
democratic governance, foster support for decisions, and gener241
In the context of
ate substantively better outcomes.
geoengineering governance, Dane Scott and Jane C.S. Long argue that “[p]ublic deliberation can highlight inappropriate profit-making concerns, point out unbalanced scientific positions,
call attention to hubris and institutional bias, and counter the
242
influence of partisan positioning on decisionmaking.” Determining how to operationalize public participation presents a
difficult matter, however, particularly when the relevant public
consists of the entire global population. Ensuring that public
engagement serves as more than an empty exercise presents a
243
further challenge. Affording public access to the information
244
generated by research provides a starting point; public comment processes and deliberative exercises offer avenues for act245
ing on that information. The public engagement associated
with the SPICE project provides an example of the influence
that public input can have on decision making processes: the
results of that engagement were delivered to a panel which in
turn instructed the researchers to reflect on the concerns raised
246
before proceeding.
Accountability overlaps with the values of transparency
and participation. Transparency promotes accountability when
those engaged in oversight explain or justify their decisions to
247
the public. Similarly, public participation can be a means of
holding governance institutions accountable for their deci248
sions. A focus on accountability highlights the importance of
240. See Rayner et al., supra note 56, at 505.
241. See LIN, supra note 107, at 20.
242. Long & Scott, supra note 150, at 51.
243. See Rayner et al., supra note 56, at 505.
244. Winickoff & Brown, supra note 5, at 81.
245. See Dilling & Hauser, supra note 20, at 560.
246. Pidgeon et al., supra note 3, at 455.
247. See Rayner et al., supra note 56, at 508; Rick Stapenhurst & Mitchell
O’Brien, Accountability in Governance, WORLD BANK, http://siteresources
.worldbank.org/PUBLICSECTORANDGOVERNANCE/Resources/
AccountabilityGovernance.pdf (last visited Apr. 16, 2016).
248. See Rayner et al., supra note 56, at 508; Stapenhurst & O’Brien, supra
note 247, at 1–2 (discussing “vertical accountability[,] . . . through which citizens, mass media and civil society seek to enforce standards of good performance on officials”).
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249

developing mechanisms for overseeing the overseers. These
mechanisms, which may include reporting requirements, funding conditions, and formal government participation, ideally
would ensure that geoengineering research governance is responsive to the international community, stakeholders, and the
public.
2. Effectiveness
A second essential characteristic of geoengineering research governance is effectiveness. Governance must effectively
address not only the physical risks associated with individual
field experiments, but also the systemic concerns attendant to
geoengineering research in general. Addressing these two sets
of issues poses formidable yet distinct challenges. The difficulties of analyzing physical risks arise largely because field tests
are inherently experimental and thus may generate unexpected
effects. Scientists can try to reduce this uncertainty by conducting careful modeling, studying natural analogues, and gradual250
ly scaling up field experiments. The process of assessing
physical risks would be a familiar one for scientists, just as the
subsequent process of risk management would be familiar to
policy makers. It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that extant
proposals for geoengineering research oversight focus on physical risks.
By contrast, concerns regarding lock-in, moral hazard, and
future military conflict differ from worries about physical risks
in two important ways. First, these concerns are beyond the
scope of hard scientific inquiry. Social scientists can contribute
useful insights on these matters and offer instructive analogies,
but can provide no ready quantitative assessments. Policy decisions regarding geoengineering research will require an uneasy
merger of qualitative analysis of these concerns with quantitative risk data. Second, these concerns are systemic and cumulative—they arise not so much from any individual research project as from the overall trajectory of geoengineering research.
Thanks to the cumulative nature of these concerns, they are
unlikely to be given much weight in the review of single re249. See Stapenhurst & O’Brien, supra note 247, at 1 (“[A]ccountability exists when there is a relationship where an individual or body, and the performance of tasks or functions by that individual or body, are subject to another’s
oversight . . . .” (emphasis omitted)).
250. See, e.g., KEITH, supra note 34, at 80–88 (advocating gradual ramping
up of research and field experimentation).
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search projects and are prone to omission from research governance proposals. Effective consideration of systemic concerns
will require holistic rather than piecemeal review of
geoengineering research.
B. DESIGN OPTIONS
Governance can be undertaken by different actors, through
different institutions, at different scales, and via different
251
tools. The following discussion identifies key considerations
in designing a governance system for geoengineering research.
First, who should be involved in governance? The technical
nature of geoengineering demands the involvement of scientists
in governance, most importantly independent experts who can
252
impartially evaluate research proposals and results. Scholars
outside the hard sciences also can provide important contributions regarding the social and ethical implications of field experiments. Yet experts alone should not decide whether or how
geoengineering research proceeds. Humanity has a common interest in a stable climate, as reflected in various calls for
253
geoengineering to be regulated as a “public good.” Because
decisions regarding geoengineering research will have important ramifications for public policy, democratically accountable institutions should participate in making these decisions.
Legitimacy further demands that potentially affected persons
have a voice. The systemic concerns posed by even relatively
limited field experiments make it essential to integrate the
public into the governance process early on, rather than wait254
ing until experiments have significant physical impacts.
Second, through what institutions and at what scale
should governance occur? Governance need not necessarily occur through government. Various entities could participate in
geoengineering research governance, including professional associations and other peer-based organizations, nongovernmen251. E.g., SOLAR RADIATION MGMT. GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE, supra note
46, at 30 (identifying different scales of regulation, ranging from individual
regulation by researchers themselves to international regulation).
252. See Parson & Ernst, supra note 32, at 328.
253. Rayner et al., supra note 56, at 505; see also ASILOMAR SCI. ORG.
COMM., supra note 178 (listing “[p]romoting the collective benefit of humankind and the environment” as the primary purpose of geoengineering research).
254. This would be in contrast to proposals to expand participation as the
scale of research expands. SOLAR RADIATION MGMT. GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE,
supra note 46, at 38.
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tal organizations, national governments, and international
treaty organizations. The scientific community’s core mechanism for promoting accuracy in research is peer review. More
generally, professional associations can ingrain values into
members of a research or occupational community through
255
codes of conduct and the like. These forms of governance offer
256
But
potential advantages of flexibility and adaptability.
geoengineering research governance requires far more than the
promotion of research accuracy or the inculcation of ethical
practices among geoengineering researchers. Society has a
strong interest in determining the course of geoengineering research, and governance must incorporate its values and concerns. One means of incorporating social values into an oversight regime is through the participation of nongovernmental
organizations, such as certification societies or nonprofit envi257
ronmental monitors. However, absent government sanction—
and perhaps even in its presence—such governance may not be
258
Governance
perceived as representative or legitimate.
through national governments or international treaty organizations is more likely to offer the legitimacy essential to
geoengineering research. International oversight requires a
level of cooperation that national oversight does not. Climate
change is a problem of the global commons, however, and the
global implications of geoengineering research call for representation of those whom geoengineering would affect. There is
a further, practical argument for international oversight or international coordination of oversight: research restrictions may
have limited effect unless they extend beyond national bounda-

255. See LIN, supra note 107, at 167; Lorna Weir & Michael J. Selgelid,
Professionalization as a Governance Strategy for Synthetic Biology, 3 SYSTEMS
& SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY 91, 94 (2009).
256. Marchant & Pope, supra note 45, at 389.
257. See Cathy C. Conrad & Krista G. Hilchey, A Review of Citizen Science
and Community-Based Environmental Monitoring: Issues and Opportunities,
176 ENVTL. MONITORING & ASSESSMENT 273, 276–78 (2011) (discussing different forms of community-based monitoring); Ewald Rametsteiner & Markku
Simula, Forest Certification—an Instrument To Promote Sustainable Forest
Management?, 67 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 87, 89–90 (2003) (discussing implementation of forest certification schemes).
258. See, e.g., Benjamin Cashore et al., Forest Certification (Eco-Labeling)
Programs and Their Policy-Making Authority: Explaining Divergence Among
North American and European Case Studies, 5 FOREST POL’Y & ECON. 225,
228–37 (2003) (discussing various forest certification schemes and their perceived legitimacy).
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259

ries. Ultimately, broad, multilateral participation in an international governance regime can foster its reach and legiti260
macy, though the involvement of large numbers of countries
261
may diminish its effectiveness.
International governance could take place through a single
institution, but the breadth of potential geoengineering activities makes it more likely that a complex of multiple institutions
262
would jointly govern the subject. One observer has described
the current state of international geoengineering governance,
including actions taken under the CBD and LC/LP treaty regimes to address geoengineering research, as an “emerging in263
These institutions eventually may
stitutional complex.”
merge into a single regime in which one institution dominates
264
and sets a general policy direction. Or they may evolve inde265
pendently and continue to act without any coordination. A
single institution that takes the lead in geoengineering govern266
ance could fulfill various functions. Most importantly, such
an institution would be situated to take a broad, programmatic
view of all geoengineering research and to do so in the context
of other options for responding to climate change. It might also
develop overarching principles and coordinate arrangements by
267
other institutions. The involvement of multiple institutions
268
can offer benefits of expertise and specialization. In addition,
combining the efforts of a broad institution with more specialized institutions can avoid burdening policy makers with the
269
minutiae of implementing a complex oversight regime. Such a

259. See Singer, supra note 45, at 227–28 (contending that national decisions not to research a subject “will not stop the knowledge emerging somewhere in the world”); cf. Marchant & Pope, supra note 45, at 381 (remarking
that international regulation might in principle prevent off-shoring of research
but is difficult to accomplish in practice).
260. BODLE ET AL., supra note 21, at 124.
261. Bodansky, supra note 21, at 544.
262. See BODLE ET AL., supra note 21, at 132.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 133.
265. See id.
266. Id. at 156–57.
267. Id.
268. See Bodansky, supra note 21, at 545 (suggesting “a broadly-inclusive
international institution . . . for the development of general rules regarding
geoengineering” but “a smaller group with technical expertise” or national decision-makers for applying such rules).
269. See id. at 544–45.
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differentiated approach may suit the oversight of research into
widely varying geoengineering techniques.
A third design question turns to the choice of specific tools
of governance. Tools of governance can include formal “hard”
270
regulation as well as “soft” governance processes. Formal
regulation includes prohibitions, restrictions, permitting sys271
tems, and notification and disclosure requirements. Hard law
obligations flow from recognized lawmaking processes and are
272
generally binding. Soft governance processes refer to other,
nonbinding means of influencing activity, such as the establishment of guidelines, recommendations, or norms, as well as
273
funding allocation decisions.
To date, efforts to govern geoengineering research have
primarily involved soft law. For example, decisions by governments to fund—or not to fund—geoengineering research have
had a direct effect on research levels and have sent implicit
messages regarding the acceptability of such research. Government funding decisions cannot carry out the full range of
desired governance functions, however, nor do they directly
control research funded by private parties. Soft governance efforts have also included bottom-up efforts to develop voluntary
274
guidelines. Although such efforts can be a relatively simple
and flexible means of establishing norms, they have produced
only “consensus statements . . . lacking the specificity needed to
help any body—governmental or scientific—enact operational
governance and assessment procedures” with respect to
275
geoengineering research. Indeed, the best known guidelines,
the Oxford Principles, are described by their own authors as
“high-level and abstract,” “intended . . . to be interpreted and
implemented in different ways, appropriate to the technology
under consideration and the stage of its development, as well
276
as the wider social context of the research.”

270. SOLAR RADIATION MGMT. GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE, supra note 46, at
29.
271. See BODLE ET AL., supra note 21, at 131–32.
272. See DANIEL BODANSKY, THE ART AND CRAFT OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 13–14 (2010).
273. See SOLAR RADIATION MGMT. GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE, supra note 46,
at 29; Bodansky, supra note 21, at 544.
274. E.g., SOLAR RADIATION MGMT. GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE, supra note
46, at 36; see also BODLE ET AL., supra note 21, at 124 (discussing such efforts).
275. Parson & Keith, supra note 16.
276. Rayner et al., supra note 56, at 504.
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C. PUTTING TOGETHER THE MISSING PIECES
Governance of geoengineering research should address
physical risks as well as systemic concerns. Because the existing literature already suggests various options for addressing
277
physical risks, the discussion below focuses on addressing
systemic concerns. A governance regime might mitigate systemic risks through a variety of mechanisms, but should include several key elements. These elements are: programmatic
technology assessment, analysis of the systemic risks posed by
specific geoengineering techniques, prioritization of research
into techniques involving lesser systemic risks, and institution
of safeguards against systemic risks.
1. Ongoing Programmatic Technology Assessment
a. General Design Issues
A developing consensus in the scientific community sup278
ports external review of geoengineering field research. The
oversight typically contemplated would involve project-byproject review to identify a particular experiment’s physical
risks and to provide an opportunity for public input. Such review is essential, but unlikely to account adequately for the
cumulative effects of multiple research projects. More importantly, project-by-project review would miss the systemic
concerns of geoengineering research—lock-in, moral hazard,
and increased potential for conflict.
These shortcomings resemble a common flaw encountered
in National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) analysis: environmental impact statements (EISs) for individual projects often overlook indirect, cumulative, or programmatic effects.
NEPA requires federal agencies to prepare an EIS for major
federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
279
environment. Programmatic EISs offer one means of articulating and analyzing effects that extend beyond individual pro280
jects. In contrast to piecemeal, project-specific assessments,
277. See supra Part II.A.1.
278. Parson & Ernst, supra note 32, at 320, 324 (suggesting that one
“point[] of strong consensus” is that “research itself needs governance”); see
also Editorial, A Charter for Geoengineering, 485 NATURE 415, 415 (2012)
(calling for regulation before geoengineering field experiments begin).
279. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2012).
280. See Jon C. Cooper, Broad Programmatic, Policy and Planning Assessments Under the National Environmental Policy Act and Similar Devices: A
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programmatic analyses evaluate the environmental impacts of
multiple facilities, multiple projects, or agency-wide policies or
programs. These analyses consequently can identify and resolve difficult but important issues that might otherwise be
281
avoided. Programmatic EISs can be substantial undertakings, however, and judicial interpretations of NEPA require
282
their preparation only in fairly narrow circumstances. Not
surprisingly, in analyzing similar but unrelated research projects, federal agencies often dodge the consideration of broader
283
systemic concerns.
The proposal here moves beyond NEPA’s requirements and
urges an ongoing programmatic technology assessment of
geoengineering research activities. This assessment would consider the cumulative effects of multiple research projects, examine the developmental trajectory of specific techniques in
light of ongoing research, and tease out scientific, social, and
284
ethical issues. As explained in more detail below, the proposed analysis would differ from conventional NEPA analysis
in several ways. First, it would consider the effects of all
geoengineering research activities and do so within the context
of other strategies for responding to climate change. Analysis
Quiet Revolution in an Approach to Environmental Considerations, 11 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 89, 94, 133–34 (1993).
281. See id. at 116 (“[A] programmatic/policy assessment is an attempt by
high-level officials to examine the implications of the programs/policies from
top to bottom.”); id. at 136.
282. See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 405–06 (1976) (holding that
preparation of studies of possible resource development does not trigger obligation to prepare an EIS absent a specific proposal); Nat. Res. Def. Council v.
U.S. Dep’t of Navy, No. CV-01-07781 CAS (RZX), 2002 WL 32095131, at *13–
17 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2002) (rejecting claim that Navy tests of antisubmarine technologies required programmatic NEPA review).
283. See Found. on Econ. Trends v. Lyng, 817 F.2d 882, 884–85 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (finding no programmatic EIS required for “diverse” and “discrete” animal productivity research projects); Found. on Econ. Trends v. Heckler, 756
F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (vacating lower court injunction of GMO deliberate
release experiments in absence of programmatic EIS); Cooper, supra note 280,
at 117–18 (discussing agencies’ wide discretion in deciding whether to prepare
programmatic EISs and their opposition to doing so). No law bars agencies
from conducting programmatic EISs to analyze systemic concerns, and NEPA
regulations encourage the preparation of EISs for research programs for new
technologies. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.4(c)(3) (2015) (“[A]gencies may find it useful
to evaluate the proposal(s) . . . [b]y stage of technological development including federal or federally assisted research, development or demonstration programs for new technologies . . . .”).
284. Cf. Rayner et al., supra note 56, at 507 (urging “[r]egular assessments
of the impacts of geoengineering research” to address the environmental and
socioeconomic impacts of research).
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should encompass social and systemic effects in addition to
physical effects. Second, the tools of analysis would include not
only environmental impact analysis, but also scenario planning, vision assessment, and other future-oriented analyses.
Third, the analytical process would be ongoing rather than discrete.
The proposed geoengineering technology assessment would
extend more broadly than ordinary NEPA analysis. It would
consider all geoengineering research activities, regardless of
federal funding, approval, or involvement. Ideally, this analysis
would account for research activities both inside and outside
the United States. Such a broad-ranging analysis is feasible.
While some research might occur beyond public scrutiny, most
geoengineering researchers believe that transparency is essential and are willing to make public their experiments and re285
sults. Furthermore, the proposed assessment would give close
attention to the policy context of geoengineering research.
Agencies often limit the range of alternatives in NEPA anal286
yses to fit their narrowly defined needs. The assessment of
geoengineering alternatives, in contrast, should be part of a
broader discussion concerning the full range of climate change
287
policy options. Equally important, the analysis should extend
beyond technical design issues and safety and environmental
concerns to consider social, economic, and other relevant ef288
fects. A comprehensive approach is necessary to assess lock285. See Dilling & Hauser, supra note 20, at 559 (noting that transparency
“has repeatedly come up as a necessary component of a geoengineering governance framework”); Morgan et al., supra note 51 (recommending “guidelines
to provide open access to SRM knowledge”); see also BPC, supra note 52, at 14
(affirming importance of transparency); ROYAL SOC’Y, supra note 28, at 52
(“Research activity should be as open . . . as possible . . . .”).
286. See James Allen, NEPA Alternatives Analysis: The Evolving Exclusion
of Remote and Speculative Alternatives, 25 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.
287, 300–09 (2005) (discussing case law); cf. City of Alexandria v. Slater, 198
F.3d 862, 867 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (reviewing agency’s objectives and agency’s
evaluation of alternatives in light of these objectives “with considerable deference to the agency’s expertise and policy-making role”).
287. Cf. Rob Bellamy et al., “Opening Up” Geoengineering Appraisal: MultiCriteria Mapping of Options for Tackling Climate Change, 23 GLOBAL ENVTL.
CHANGE 926, 927 (2013) (contending that the failure of existing
geoengineering appraisals to reflect mitigation and adaptation alternatives for
responding to climate change has “closed down” debate and can lead to premature lock-in).
288. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2012); Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People
Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 774 (1983) (holding that agencies must
consider only those effects where there is “a reasonably close causal relationship between a change in the physical environment and the effect at issue”).
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in, moral hazard, and other systemic effects, and to consider social acceptability as well as technical readiness. Indeed, the assessment process itself, if done in a careful and open manner,
may mitigate these systemic concerns by identifying the limitations and flaws of geoengineering techniques.
The proposed assessment would identify trends and future
technological developments, yet should endeavor to do more
than predict the future. Another important function would be
to envision possible future scenarios and stimulate public discourse regarding those scenarios. Accordingly, the assessment
process should incorporate analytical techniques in addition to
the risk analyses and impact assessments that typically dominate EISs. Scenario planning, vision assessment, and other innovative techniques would also be useful. In scenario planning,
participants develop narratives that identify important deci289
sions, events, and consequences of plausible future scenarios.
Policy makers can use these scenarios to conduct more effective
290
strategic planning in the face of uncertainty. These scenarios
also can serve as the subject of public engagement exercises
and thereby facilitate discussions about societal goals. Another
technique, vision assessment, evaluates far-reaching yet plausible technological visions articulated by scientists and others.
This analysis can provide strategic knowledge for bringing
about—or preventing—such visions and shaping public debate
291
about future technologies.
Researchers are beginning to explore how these futuring
techniques may inform geoengineering policy. A recent scenar289. See JAMES A. OGILVY, CREATING BETTER FUTURES: SCENARIO PLANTOOL FOR A BETTER TOMORROW 175–76 (2002); David N. Bengston,
Futures Research: A Neglected Dimension in Environmental Policy and Planning, in ENVIRONMENTAL FUTURES RESEARCH: EXPERIENCES, APPROACHES,
AND OPPORTUNITIES 4, 8 (2012). A recent scenario planning exercise focused
on SRM. See GLOBAL GOVERNANCE FUTURES, HUMAN INTERVENTION IN THE
EARTH’S CLIMATE: THE GOVERNANCE OF GEOENGINEERING IN 2025+ (2015).
290. See Bengston, supra note 289; Stephen R. Carpenter & Adena R.
Rissman, Scenarios and Decisionmaking for Complex Environmental Systems,
in ENVIRONMENTAL FUTURES RESEARCH, supra note 289, at 37–38 (noting
that scenario planning helps policy makers deal with “profound uncertainty”);
cf. OGILVY, supra note 289, at 176–77 (noting that scenario planning fosters
“bottom-up innovation and creativity”).
291. See Armin Grunwald, Vision Assessment as a New Element of the FTA
Toolbox, EU-US SEMINAR: NEW TECHNOLOGY FORESIGHT, FORECASTING &
ASSESSMENT METHODS 53, 56–60 (2004), http://foresight.jrc.ec.europa.eu/fta/
papers/Session%204%20What's%20the%20Use/Vision%20Assessment%20as%
20a%20new%20element%20of%20the%20FTA%20toolbox.pdf (explaining the
role of visions and vision assessment in technology).
NING AS A
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io-planning exercise concerning solar radiation management,
for example, generated six scenarios premised on differing levels of stakeholder self-interest and technological controllabil292
ity. The conveners of the exercise suggested that the scenarios offer “insight into some of the dynamics that may shape how
our world unfolds” and could assist in evaluating proposals for
293
SRM governance across varying conditions.
Any programmatic assessment of geoengineering should
294
incorporate broad and meaningful public engagement. At a
minimum, such engagement would raise public understanding
of geoengineering and its limitations. Public hearings, deliberative exercises, and the like would not only provide information,
but also encourage input, identify concerns, and stimulate debate.
Without
adequate
public
engagement,
future
geoengineering field experiments are likely to encounter opposition akin to that provoked by the SPICE experiment. Public
engagement, in other words, can help establish the social license for field research and legitimize research governance.
Generating effective public engagement may not be easy.
Technical descriptions of geoengineering proposals could exclude lay citizens from meaningful participation. Speculative
accounts of relatively untested techniques could lead to unproductive discussions or irrational responses. In addition, the
broad and general scope of a programmatic assessment may
limit interest in participation. Assessments of specific proposed
field experiments, in contrast, might stimulate immediate concern and more intense interest. Relatedly, geoengineering and
climate change present long-term issues that must compete for
attention with seemingly more urgent matters. The public reactions to the SPICE and Haida experiments nevertheless suggest that geoengineering’s controversial nature will generate
keen interest. Creative methods of outreach and attention from
policy makers and opinion leaders may be necessary.
It is worth noting that public engagement is unlikely to
lead to social consensus. Participatory processes often yield

292. See YALE CLIMATE & ENERGY INST., SCENARIO PLANNING FOR SOLAR
RADIATION MANAGEMENT 8 (2013).
293. Id. at 26. A prominent issue raised in discussions of the scenarios was
the slippery slope concern that technologies, once developed, tend to be used.
Id. at 6.
294. See Winickoff & Brown, supra note 5, at 82 (also suggesting the publication of accessible reports and outreach to mass media outlets).
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more questions than answers. In the case of geoengineering,
reconciling opposing views may be especially difficult because
controversies touch on deeply-held values regarding humanity’s
capabilities and limitations and humanity’s proper relationship
296
to nature. Rather than seeking to produce consensus, participatory processes ideally would “explor[e] systematic divergences of perspective” and provide insights to inform policy making
297
on geoengineering and geoengineering research.
b. Mechanics
When should a programmatic geoengineering technology
assessment begin, and who should conduct it? The systemic
concerns raised by geoengineering research argue for commencing the proposed assessment before further field experimentation gets underway. Putting in place an assessment process
would provide some assurance that independent oversight of
field research is taking place. Early assessment and public discussion would ease worries that the science is proceeding faster
than society can control it and counter the danger of technological lock-in. Preferably, the assessment process would be ongoing or recurring rather than a one-time event. Ongoing analysis
would enable consideration of new developments in
geoengineering research, climate change science, and global
events. Such a process also would facilitate a deepening understanding of geoengineering, promote continuing societal deliberation, and encourage the consideration of exit strategies
298
should a once-promising technique prove to be problematic.

295. See Andy Stirling, “Opening Up” and “Closing Down”: Power, Participation, and Pluralism in the Social Appraisal of Technology, 33 SCI. TECH. &
HUM. VALUES 262, 282 (2008) (noting that participatory appraisals of technology may not lead to “final consensus”).
296. See Adam Corner et al., Messing with Nature? Exploring Public Perceptions of Geoengineering in the UK, 23 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 938, 942
(2013) (noting that the theme of “messing with nature” stood out in public deliberative workshops involving the public on geoengineering); Dan M. Kahan
et al., Geoengineering and Climate Change Polarization: Testing a TwoChannel Model of Science Communication, 685 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POLIT. &
SOC. SCI. 192, 193 (2014) (noting that “cultural meanings influence public perceptions” of geoengineering risk); Rayner, supra note 213, at 12–13 (noting
that geoengineering implicates “what it means to be human and our relationship with nature”).
297. Stirling, supra note 295.
298. Cf. Walker, supra note 187, at 844–45 (discussing importance of considering exit strategies as a defense to lock-in).
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In the United States, the federal government is the entity
best situated to undertake the proposed assessment. The federal government has financial, technical, and other resources to
support an assessment and could offer a more objective approach than private parties. Furthermore, the federal government has the general authority and means to act on the resulting information and recommendations. As a significant source
of research funding, it can create and enforce conditions on
geoengineering research grants.
Effectiveness and trust are important criteria in identifying a specific federal actor to carry out the assessment. Logical
candidates include the Environmental Protection Agency,
which has expertise in analyzing health and environmental
consequences, and the Government Accountability Office,
which has performed an increasing number of technology as299
sessments in recent years. Both agencies have experience in
carrying out assessments, though on a smaller scale and a more
discrete basis than envisioned here. Although the work of these
agencies is increasingly subject to politicization and partisan
attack, their involvement may be preferable to creating a new
agency to carry out the assessment. An agency focused on
geoengineering—whose existence may be contingent on contin300
ued research and eventual deployment —may be more vulnerable to bias.
Regardless of the agency tasked with preparing the assessment, an important complementary role could be played by
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or a government advisory committee composed of experts, representatives of potentially affected communities, and representatives of diverse po301
litical viewpoints. NGOs such as World Wide Views could
carry out citizen consultations and other participatory exercises
to engage the public and explore public views on a global
302
scale. Furthermore, a government advisory committee could
offer greater independence and flexibility than established gov299. See LIN, supra note 107, at 25. One of the GAO’s assessments concerned geoengineering and included a technical assessment of specific techniques, consultation with experts, and a public survey. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 52.
300. See Long & Scott, supra note 150, at 51 (noting that geoengineering
faces hurdles to research and deployment).
301. See Winickoff & Brown, supra note 5, at 81.
302. See Bjørn Bedsted et al., The Story of WWViews, in CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE 30 (Mikko Rask et al. eds.,
2012); WORLD WIDE VIEWS, http://wwviews.org (last visited Apr. 16, 2016).
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ernment agencies and could provide advice on an oversight
303
While such a committee could be a valuable
framework.
source of input in structuring a programmatic assessment or
project-specific oversight, a government agency should retain
the responsibility for carrying out the assessment and engagement functions.
The proposed technology assessment would move beyond
current ad hoc efforts to manage geoengineering research. These efforts include formal legal mechanisms (such as the
amendment to the London Protocol), soft law mechanisms (such
as the Oxford Principles), information gathering initiatives
(such as prior reports prepared by the GAO), and outreach efforts (such as the SRMGI). None of these efforts purport to assess, let alone comprehensively govern, geoengineering field research. Nor do extant efforts offer a broad forum for public
input and engagement. A programmatic geoengineering technology assessment would make significant advances in these
regards.
The proposed assessment nonetheless can build on existing
efforts, such as the Integrated Assessment of Geoengineering
Proposals (IAGP). The IAGP is a four-year multidisciplinary
research project funded by British research agencies and car304
ried out by several institutions. The IAGP’s “core research objectives” include evaluating the effectiveness and side-effects of
geoengineering proposals and assessing the controllability of
305
global climate using these proposals. The IAGP emphasizes
technical evaluation and arguably neglects the systemic concerns of geoengineering research. Nonetheless, researchers as303. Winickoff & Brown, supra note 5, at 83; see also Long & Scott, supra
note 150 (discussing possible functions of an independent geoengineering advisory board).
304. Who We Are, INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF GEOENGINEERING PROPOSALS, http://www.iagp.ac.uk/who-we-are.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2016)
[hereinafter IAGP]; see also KAREN PARKHILL & NICK PIDGEON, PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT ON GEOENGINEERING RESEARCH: PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE
SPICE DELIBERATIVE WORKSHOPS 4 (2011) (detailing the history and aims of
the IAGP).
305. See IAGP, supra note 304. The IAGP’s central tasks include
developing a framework for assessing the viability of various techniques and
engaging various stakeholders and the public. See Developing a Framework for
the Evaluation of Geoengineering Proposals, INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF
GEOENGINEERING PROPOSALS, http://www.iagp.ac.uk/1-developing-framework
-evaluation-geoengineering-proposals.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2016); Engaging with Member of the Public and Other Stakeholders, INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF GEOENGINEERING PROPOSALS, http://www.iagp.ac.uk/2-engaging
-member-public-and-other-stakeholders (last visited Apr. 16, 2016).
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sociated with the IAGP have undertaken several projects that
are consistent with the programmatic assessment proposed
here, such as a broadly-based appraisal of geoengineering op306
tions by two dozen specialists, a similar appraisal by thirteen
307
citizens, and public discussion groups of climate change and
308
geoengineering.
Finally, although the proposal here is for the U.S. government to initiate the proposed assessment, it need not—and
should not—have exclusive control over geoengineering research assessment. Rather, geoengineering is an issue that
demands international participation in an ongoing global conversation. Other governments could undertake similar assessments on their own, participate in a U.S.-led assessment, or respond to specific issues raised by a U.S. assessment. The Kyiv
Protocol to the Espoo Convention, which some twenty-six European nations have joined, requires parties to conduct a strategic environmental assessment of plans and programs likely to
309
have significant environmental effects. Such an assessment
process could offer a framework for conducting the programmatic technology assessment suggested here.
Nor should any programmatic assessment serve as an endpoint for governance efforts. Ideally, a programmatic assessment would serve as a springboard for further analysis, debate,
and policy making on geoengineering research. Perhaps most
obviously, the programmatic assessment should inform the establishment of an oversight regime for individual field trials.
Such oversight, which can build on existing governance efforts
under the CBD and LC/LP as well as research governance pro-

306. See Bellamy et al., supra note 287, at 928.
307. See Rob Bellamy et al., Deliberative Mapping of Options for Tackling
Climate Change: Citizens and Specialists “Open Up” Appraisal of
Geoengineering, PUB. UNDERSTANDING OF SCI., 2014, at 1, 5, http://pus
.sagepub.com/content/early/2014/09/12/0963662514548628.full.pdf.
308. See Corner et al., supra note 296, at 938.
309. Protocol on Strategic Environmental Assessment to the Convention on
Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, May 21,
2003, U.N. Doc. ECE/MP.EIA/2003/2, http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/
env/eia/documents/legaltexts/protocolenglish.pdf. The Protocol has thirty-eight
signatories as of April 16, 2016. Status of Protocol on Strategic Environmental
Assessment to the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a
Transboundary Context, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, https://
treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-4-b&
chapter=27&lang=en (last visited Apr. 16, 2016).
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posals in the literature, would focus on the physical risks associated with individual experiments.
2. Analyze Dangers and Set Research Priorities
The proposed assessment would analyze both the physical
hazards and systemic dangers of prospective geoengineering
techniques. In contrast to conventional assessments of physical
risk, the assessment of systemic dangers would be a somewhat
novel undertaking. For illustrative purposes, this section considers how the proposed assessment might identify techniques
posing a greater danger of lock-in.
From studying technologies such as nuclear power, commentators have identified various technical and organizational
311
indicators of technological inflexibility. Technical indicators
of inflexibility pertain to the inherent features of a technique,
whereas organizational indicators pertain to how a technology
312
is likely to be framed and developed. Technical indicators of
inflexibility include high capital intensity, long lead times from
idea to application, large-scale production units, substantial in313
frastructure requirements, and irreversibility. Such characteristics lead to inflexibility because they generally call for
large upfront commitments of effort, funding, political capital,
or other resources. Once made, these commitments can be politically and psychologically difficult to undo. The momentum behind inflexible technologies derives not only from their scale
but also from their tendency to create powerful constituencies
and institutions having a vested interest in perpetuating or expanding existing commitments.
Organizational indicators of inflexibility arise from the institutional and social contexts surrounding a technology rather
than from the technology itself. These indicators include hype,
hubris, closure to criticism, and operation through organiza314
tions having a single mission. Such features foster lock-in by
310. See supra Parts I.B, II.A.1.
311. See Shackley & Thompson, supra note 190, at 115 (characterizing
conventional nuclear power as “relatively inflexible” and renewable power as
“relatively flexible”).
312. See id. at 112, 115.
313. See DAVID COLLINGRIDGE, THE MANAGEMENT OF SCALE: BIG ORGANIZATIONS, BIG DECISIONS, BIG MISTAKES 14 (1992); ROYAL COMM’N ON ENVTL.
POLLUTION, NOVEL MATERIALS IN THE ENVIRONMENT: THE CASE OF NANOTECHNOLOGY 8 (2008); Cairns, supra note 182, at 655; Shackley & Thompson,
supra note 190, at 112.
314. See Shackley & Thompson, supra note 190, at 115.
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suppressing critical inquiry, fashioning social expectations, and
315
diminishing the possibility of changing course. Although organizational indicators of inflexibility are not inherent to specific technologies, they often accompany technologies that have
features of technical inflexibility. For example, the nuclear industry, which runs large-scale, capital-intensive facilities, historically has resisted critical scrutiny and operated through
316
single-mission companies or organizations.
How might the factors of technical and organizational inflexibility apply to various geoengineering proposals? A thorough analysis is beyond the scope of this Article, but several
preliminary observations can be made. All geoengineering
techniques are far from effective application and would require
substantial effort and resources to ready them for deploy317
ment. The long lead time to deployment indicates that each
technique is at some risk of lock-in if field experimentation pro318
ceeds. Other indicators of inflexibility nonetheless suggest a
higher risk of lock-in for some techniques than others. SRM
techniques, which have attracted some support because of their
319
potential to provide cheap and rapid cooling, have been the
focus of governance concerns because of the physical risks and

315. See id.
316. See id. at 113–14 tbl.1 (presenting the flexibility characteristics of the
nuclear industry in tabular form).
317. See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 52, at v–vi; see also
Gordon MacKerron, Costs and Economics of Geoengineering 12 (Climate
Geoengineering Governance Working Paper Series, Paper No. 13, 2014), http://
geoengineering-governance-research.org/perch/resources/workingpaper13
mackerroncostsandeconomicsofgeoengineering.pdf (noting that for all
geoengineering options, “the state of technological development is exceptionally limited, and in most cases does not yet extend to any kind of even smallscale demonstration”).
318. See Bellamy et al., supra note 198, at 611 (noting that geoengineering
proposals, “[a]s an upstream suite of technology proposals . . . are particularly
sensitive to . . . instrumental framing conditions and could easily be quickly
and prematurely closed down, locking us in to certain technological trajectories but not others”).
319. See Parson & Ernst, supra note 32, at 314 (describing the SRM techniques that “offer extremely high leverage” as “fast, cheap, and imperfect”).
The cost of delivering aerosols with specially designed aircraft has been estimated to be in the range of $10 billion to $25 billion, a small fraction of global
GDP. See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 52, at 31 tbl.3.2 (reporting estimated first-year cost of $35 billion to $65 billion and subsequent annual costs of $13 billion to $25 billion); Morgan et al., supra note 51, at 40 (reporting $10 billion estimate); Robock, supra note 59, at 166 (discussing various
quantitative cost estimates).
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international conflict they might cause. SRM techniques also
warrant careful scrutiny because their implementation would
require sizable economic, social, and political commitments
321
over extended periods of time.
To take an example, consider stratospheric aerosol release.
This often-cited SRM technique possesses several indicators of
inflexibility. First, it faces a long lead time: a leading proponent
estimates a deployable stratospheric aerosol system to be at
322
least two decades away. Second, significant hype surrounds
the technique: popular accounts sometimes characterize it as a
“cheap and simple solution[]” to a “straightforward engineering
323
problem.” The cost estimates on which such statements rest
are probably low, however. These estimates typically quantify
only direct costs, omitting external costs to society or the envi324
ronment. Furthermore, optimism bias, structural incentives,
and the need for unanticipated design changes consistently
lead to underestimates of the costs of novel, large-scale tech325
nologies. A third indicator of inflexibility is the substantial
capital and infrastructure that stratospheric aerosol deployment would require. If aircraft are used, for example, a dedicated fleet of specialized planes would have to make hundreds
or thousands of flights per day over perhaps hundreds of
326
years. Deployment of the technique would likely create pow320. See, e.g., SOLAR RADIATION MGMT. GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE, supra
note 46 (analyzing the physical and political risks of SRM); Morgan et al., supra note 51 (recommending development and implementation of a voluntary
code for SRM research).
321. The use of space-based solar deflectors, for example, would involve the
deployment of trillions of reflecting discs or tens of thousands of large mirrors.
See ROYAL SOC’Y, supra note 28, at 32.
322. See KEITH, supra note 34, at 88; see also GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 52, at 33 (rating stratospheric aerosol technology as very immature “because only basic principles have been reported”).
323. STEVEN D. LEVITT & STEPHEN J. DUBNER, SUPERFREAKONOMICS 193–
94 (2009). Professor Scott Barrett similarly lauds its “incredible economics.”
Scott Barrett, The Incredible Economics of Geoengineering, 39 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 45 (2008); see also Alan Carlin, Global Climate Change Control:
Is There a Better Strategy Than Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions?, 155 U.
PA. L. REV. 1401, 1459–60 (2007).
324. See MacKerron, supra note 317, at 4. Indeed, MacKerron contends
that the direct cost estimates of stratospheric aerosol release found in the literature “are simple to the point of being simplistic” and “generally far from
contemporary good practice.” Id. at 5.
325. See id. at 7–9, 12.
326. See Alan Robock et al., Benefits, Risks, and Costs of Stratospheric
Geoengineering, GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS, Oct. 2, 2009, at 1, 2–7 (discussing possible methods of delivering aerosols to the stratosphere); R. Turco,
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erful economic constituencies and necessitate a centralized
structure designed to ensure its smooth and unhindered opera327
tion. One final indicator of technology inflexibility for stratospheric aerosol release is its irreversibility, which would be
two-fold. For one, it would be virtually impossible to recover released particles, which would be problematic if they turned out
328
to be harmful. Sulfur species are already present in the atmosphere in large quantities and pose relatively wellunderstood risks, but specially engineered aerosols could give
rise to new or uncertain hazards. For another, it would be quite
difficult to reverse any SRM scheme, including stratospheric
329
aerosol release, once it is fully deployed. This latter difficulty—often referred to as the “termination problem”—arises from
the fact that the sudden cessation of SRM would result in an
330
extremely rapid rebound to ungeoengineered conditions. Human societies and natural ecosystems would have little time to
adapt to such a swift change in climate.
Further analyses of individual geoengineering techniques
would identify techniques less susceptible to lock-in. Analyses
also would consider the extent to which techniques may pose a
moral hazard or heighten the risks of military conflict. A realistic and accessible assessment could itself counter moral hazard
if it underscores the need to mitigate. And at the least, it could
identify those techniques less likely to be misperceived as a
331
magic bullet against climate change.

Geoengineering the Stratospheric Sulfate Layer from Aircraft Platforms:
Scale, Engineering Constraints, and Estimated Costs 5 (Sept. 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Minnesota Law Review); see also
MacKerron, supra note 317, at 21 (suggesting that geoengineering technologies are large-scale in that they potentially involve multi-national or global
efforts).
327. See Szerszynski et al., supra note 43, at 2812, 2814.
328. Cf. ROYAL COMM’N ON ENVTL. POLLUTION, supra note 313 (suggesting
the widespread and uncontrolled release of substances into the environment
as an indicator of technological inflexibility).
329. Relatedly, the inability to opt out of any global SRM scheme suggests
the potentially “anti-democratic constitution of the technology and its incompatibility with liberal democracy.” Macnaghten & Szerszynski, supra note 219.
330. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 63–65; H. Damon
Matthews & Ken Caldeira, Transient Climate-Carbon Simulations of Planetary Geoengineering, 104 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 9949, 9951–52 (2007)
(describing how temperatures, previously suppressed by aerosols, would quickly rebound to the levels they would have reached had no geoengineering been
implemented).
331. See Lin, supra note 204, at 708.
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Ultimately, research priority setting and resource allocation decisions should take these analyses into account. Resulting policies might resemble the “soft geoengineering” approach
described by technology scholar Robert Olson. Cautioning
against categorical rejection of geoengineering, Olson advocates
prioritizing the development of techniques that “touch gently
332
on biological and social systems.” Such techniques, he suggests, can be applied locally yet also be scaled up or rapidly reversed. In addition, these techniques ideally would offer multiple benefits, cause minimal negative impacts, resemble natural
333
processes, and be cost-effective. Among the techniques that
fare well under Olson’s criteria are the creation of microbubbles
on water body surfaces to increase their reflectivity and the
placement of light-colored material on ice to slow melting pro334
cesses. Such techniques might also do well in an analysis of
systemic concerns: they appear to pose little risk of lock-in or of
undermining mitigation efforts and are not obviously suscepti335
ble to military application.
Using the information generated by a programmatic technology assessment, governments should set research priorities
that reflect the public interest. Notwithstanding generally
prevalent notions of scientific freedom, the geoengineering research agenda should be determined by governments, not sci336
entists or private funders lacking public accountability. Nations should coordinate research efforts, whether through
existing international organizations, ad hoc agreements, or the
establishment of nonbinding guidelines that may influence re337
Ultimately, the goal-oriented nature of
search agendas.
332. Olson, supra note 210, at 30. The Royal Society report on
geoengineering similarly advocates that CDR research prioritize those methods “that remove atmospheric CO2 without affecting other natural systems
and which do not require large-scale land-use changes.” ROYAL SOC’Y, supra
note 28, at 61.
333. Olson, supra note 210, at 30.
334. See id. at 30–33.
335. See id. at 37–38.
336. See Long & Scott, supra note 150, at 50 (recommending that
geoengineering research be conducted in a “collaborative mission-driven”
manner rather than an “investigator-driven” manner).
337. See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., NANOSAFETY AT THE
OECD: THE FIRST FIVE YEARS 2006–2010, at 7–12 (2011) (summarizing efforts
by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to
coordinate environmental, health, and safety research on nanomaterials);
Bodansky, supra note 21, at 543 (observing that decisions by international institutions, while binding only on states, can affect decisions by funding agencies or scientists).
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geoengineering research calls for a strategic yet accountable
approach developed through public engagement and deliberation. Through technology assessment, funding decisions, and
direct oversight, governments can steer the scientific community toward investigating options meriting further inquiry.
3. Institute Safeguards Against Systemic Concerns
As the public reactions to the SPICE and Haida field trials
reflect, even modest experiments can represent symbolically
important commitments along a path that has not received adequate public consideration. A programmatic technology assessment can serve as a vehicle for initiating public consideration and setting research priorities. Such an assessment would
not provide definitive and permanent answers regarding how to
proceed, however. As research advances, assessment should be
ongoing, taking into account new information. Lock-in and other systemic concerns will continue to be at issue, and governments can take concrete measures in response. Measures to
consider include a moratorium on field research or full-scale
deployment, as well as the development of a diverse portfolio of
options for combating climate change.
a. A Moratorium on Field Research?
One option for combating lock-in and moral hazard is to
limit or prohibit field research. A technology cannot become
locked in, and is unlikely to undermine climate mitigation efforts, if it remains an abstract notion. A blanket ban on
geoengineering field research is improbable, however. Through
the LC/LP and CBD regimes, the international community has
already decided that certain types of geoengineering field research may be authorized, subject to specific conditions. Moreover, key nations would likely oppose a ban on field experimentation. The British government sponsored the SPICE project,
for example, and Russia has conducted field research to meas338
ure the effect of aerosols on sunlight. In the United States,
President Obama’s chief scientific advisor once declared that
geoengineering has “got to be looked at” as an option for re339
sponding to climate change. And while China has not an338. See Martin Lukacs et al., Russia Urges UN Climate Report To Include
Geoengineering, GUARDIAN (Sept. 19, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/
environment/2013/sep/19/russia-un-climate-report-geoengineering.
339. See Alok Jha, Obama Climate Adviser Open to Geo-engineering To
Tackle Global Warming, GUARDIAN (Apr. 8, 2009), http://www.theguardian
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nounced an official position on geoengineering, it lists the subject as an Earth science research priority and faces strong in340
centives to promote SRM research and its eventual use. A
broad ban on geoengineering field research would encounter
opposition not only from powerful nations but also from would341
be researchers. Indeed, effective enforcement of a ban may
not be possible, as some researchers might characterize their
work in such a way as to circumvent a ban or relocate their pro342
jects to jurisdictions where no ban applies.
In contrast to a broad prohibition on field experimentation,
which might limit research that neither raises systemic concerns nor poses physical risks, more narrowly tailored restrictions can address concerns associated with specific techniques. The fierce reaction to the SPICE project, for instance,
reveals the need to engage the public and grapple with broader
concerns prior to field experiments on stratospheric aerosol release. A moratorium on field research in this area would buy
time for the international community—and scientists—to attend to these concerns in a more satisfactory manner. The
course followed by recombinant DNA researchers four decades
ago, notwithstanding the shortcomings of the 1975 Asilomar
conference, offers a model for stimulating governance of re343
search in new technologies. Namely, an explicit moratorium
on stratospheric aerosol field experiments—whether selfimposed or government-based—could create room and support
.com/environment/2009/apr/08/geo-engineering-john-holdren. The advisor,
John Holdren, later clarified that such comments reflected his personal views
rather than official policy. See Andrew C. Revkin, Science Advisor Lays Out
Climate and Energy Plans, DOT EARTH (Apr. 9, 2009), http://dotearth
.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/04/09/science-adviser-lists-goals-on-climate-energy.
340. See Kingsley Edney & Jonathan Symons, China and the Blunt Temptations of Geo-Engineering: The Role of Solar Radiation Management in China’s Strategic Response to Climate Change, 27 PAC. REV. 307, 309–10, 325
(2014) (“China may be unusually susceptible to the ‘blunt temptations’ of geoengineering: it is politically dependent on maintaining rapid economic growth,
conceptualizes climate change as a form of environmental imperialism, is a
self-proclaimed leader of developing countries and possesses a large landmass
and an unrivalled existing weather manipulation programme that would enable unilateral implementation of SRM.”); see also Clive Hamilton, Why
Geoengineering Has Immediate Appeal to China, GUARDIAN (Mar. 22, 2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/mar/22/geoengineering-china
-climate-change.
341. See Parson & Keith, supra note 16; Rayner et al., supra note 56.
342. See Marchant & Pope, supra note 45, at 381 (discussing the potential
for scientists to relocate).
343. See supra Part I.C.
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for a programmatic technology assessment that ideally would
344
engage a wide range of stakeholders and the broader public.
b. A Moratorium on Deployment
Although this Article focuses on the governance of
geoengineering research, not deployment, an international
moratorium on geoengineering deployment could contribute in
several ways to more effective governance of geoengineering research. First, a moratorium on geoengineering deployment
345
would counter the risk of lock-in. Such a moratorium would
expressly affirm that no decision to deploy geoengineering has
been made. As long as a moratorium remains in place, deliberate action by the international community—or blatant violation
of the moratorium—would be required for deployment to occur.
Second, if its terms are sufficiently strong, a moratorium on
deployment might also allay moral hazard concerns. To be sure,
a temporary, short-term moratorium would do little to counter
the potential for geoengineering to be perceived as a substitute
for mitigation. But a more permanent moratorium or an outright prohibition of specific geoengineering techniques “could
serve as a political signal that emission reductions are the de346
fault climate policy.” Third, a moratorium on deployment
could simplify the process of developing a research governance
regime. Governance of geoengineering deployment would have
to grapple with contentious issues such as whether to
geoengineer, how and when to do so, and how to make these
347
As critical as these issues may eventually be,
decisions.
reaching agreement on them in the near term may be impossible. Close consideration of these issues would necessitate all
manner of speculation regarding geoengineering techniques

344. David Keith, a leading proponent of geoengineering research, has
stated that “[t]aking a few years to have some of the debate happen is healthier than rushing ahead with an experiment.” Geoengineering: Lift-Off, ECONOMIST, Nov. 6, 2010, at 99, 102.
345. See Zürn & Schäfer, supra note 157 (recommending “a time-limited
moratorium” on field testing “[t]o limit the risk of a slippery slope effect”).
346. BODLE ET AL., supra note 21, at 135; cf. Parson & Ernst, supra note
32, at 336 (suggesting that announcements by states that they are provisionally suspending the right to deploy geoengineering “would soothe alarm about
rapid, unilateral, or reckless pursuit” of geoengineering and “create stronger
incentives to negotiate serious measures on emissions” by “implying a potential future threat to proceed with [geoengineering] under certain conditions”).
347. See Albert C. Lin, Geoengineering Governance, 8 ISSUES LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP, No. 3, 2009, at 1, 21, 24; Lin, supra note 218, at 176.
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348

and hazards as well as future climate conditions. A moratorium on deployment would bracket these issues and concentrate
policy makers’ attention on more pressing and concrete matters
of research governance.
While some commentators argue for an absolute ban—and
349
not just a moratorium—on geoengineering deployment, a ban
could go too far in discouraging research and development. A
“prohibition of geoengineering activities as a general rule combined with exceptions under well-defined circumstances” offers
a perhaps less problematic and more politically feasible ap350
proach. As proposed in a report prepared for Germany’s Federal Environmental Agency (Umweltbundesamt), such an approach would contemplate a mandatory permit for field
experiments and other research activities and allow for the de351
velopment of additional exceptions over time. In any case,
whether the international community establishes a formal prohibition on deployment may make little practical difference in
the immediate future. There already exists a general consensus
that geoengineering deployment should not occur in the near
352
term. Indeed, the LC/LP and CBD pronouncements both take
a position against geoengineering deployment and arguably are
353
evidence of a nascent international norm in that regard.
c. Diversification
Developing a diverse geoengineering research portfolio
would be sensible for a number of reasons, including the alleviation of systemic concerns. Great uncertainty surrounds the effectiveness and acceptability of each geoengineering technique.
Diversification offers resilience in coping with these uncertainties as well as uncertainties regarding the consequences of cli354
mate change. Diversification also responds to the inability of
348. See BODLE ET AL., supra note 21, at 125 (“Regulation of research presents a natural first, and likely easier, step prior to consideration of deployment.”).
349. E.g., ETC GRP., THE CASE FOR TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT:
GEOENGINEERING (2012), http://www.etcgroup.org/sites/www.etcgroup.org/
files/TAF7_Geoengineering_042612.pdf.
350. BODLE ET AL., supra note 21, at 135.
351. Id.
352. See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 52, at 13; ROYAL
SOC’Y, supra note 28, at 57; Rayner et al., supra note 56.
353. See supra Part I.B.
354. See Andy Stirling, Direction, Distribution, and Diversity! Pluralising
Progress in Innovation, Sustainability and Development 25–26 (Soc., Tech. &
Envtl. Pathways to Sustainability, Working Paper No. 32, 2009), http://steps
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any single geoengineering technique to tackle all climate concerns, even if technical challenges are resolved. As noted earlier, ocean fertilization could sequester no more than a modest
fraction of annual anthropogenic carbon emissions, and SRM
355
techniques would do nothing to combat ocean acidification.
Importantly, diversification also counters the economic, po356
litical, and social forces that contribute to lock-in. Investing
in a variety of options makes it less likely that any one option
will become dominant and lowers the barriers to switching
away from a technology whose selection turns out to have been
357
mistaken. Furthermore, if alternative technologies are viable,
politicians, firms, and other stakeholders are less likely to be
vested in establishing and continuing with a particular tech358
nology. Cultivating alternatives also serves an important expressive function by declaring publicly that policy makers have
not chosen to deploy any specific geoengineering technique.
Opening up the appraisal of geoengineering alternatives would
ideally be part of a broader process in which society develops a
diverse set of options for addressing climate change—and not
359
Situating
just a diverse set of geoengineering options.
geoengineering within the broader context of an overall climate
response strategy would facilitate useful comparisons, reduce
the systemic risks of lock-in and moral hazard, and perhaps accommodate fundamentally divergent perspectives regarding
360
risk, science, and society.
Insulated from competition and backed by politically powerful forces, government research institutions tend to become
361
committed to a narrow course of action. To reduce the risk of
-centre.org/anewmanifesto/wp-content/uploads/stirling-paper-32.pdf.
355. See supra text accompanying notes 203–04.
356. See Cairns, supra note 182, at 651; cf. COLLINGRIDGE, supra note 313,
at 18 (recommending that government promote diverse views and plural interests in developing and choosing technologies); KEITH, supra note 34, at 151
(“Competition and diversity are the best defense against lock-in.”).
357. See Cairns, supra note 182, at 651.
358. See Stirling, supra note 354, at 26 (“[D]iversity helps resist associated
concentrations of institutional power . . . .”); Walker, supra note 187, at 834–
36, 845–46 (discussing lock-in of nuclear reprocessing technology in the United
Kingdom as alternative technological options were eliminated).
359. See generally Stirling, supra note 295, at 280–81 (advocating for social
appraisal as a means of maintaining a transparent and objective process for
evaluating climate change solutions).
360. See Bellamy, supra note 51, at 33–34.
361. See KEITH, supra note 34, at 151–52 (recommending that we “avoid
dominance by single government research institutions and instead build a cul-
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lock-in, a research diversification strategy should distribute
grants to a range of researchers, including those outside government. Funding programs should balance competing interests in incentivizing research and avoiding entrenchment of
specific techniques. While funding must be sufficient to attract
the interest of the scientific community, large and long-term
commitments can create political and economic constituencies
362
that lock in favored technologies. Limited grants and shortterm contracts, combined with a diverse research portfolio, can
preserve the space for society to make deliberate decisions regarding whether to proceed with a technology.
363
A strategy of diversification would not be costless. It
could slow the development of a specific geoengineering technique by diluting support. In addition, such a strategy could
exacerbate the moral hazard problem if it fosters the mistaken
impression that there are many possible technological fixes for
climate change. Notwithstanding these concerns, a diversified
approach can buy time for society to debate how or whether to
proceed with geoengineering. Notably, a diversification strategy
need not fund all techniques on an equal basis. Rather, it
should prioritize research into those techniques that are less
problematic in terms of their physical and systemic risks.
CONCLUSION
Amid growing scientific interest in geoengineering field experimentation, rising public discomfort with geoengineering research has stymied open and responsible field trials. Such experimentation could yield valuable information regarding the
viability of geoengineering techniques and diffuse the pressure
to conduct rogue field tests. Establishing a governance regime
for geoengineering research can address the deadlock, but such
a regime must consider more than the physical risks of field
experimentation. Geoengineering research governance also
must analyze and address systemic concerns of lock-in, moral
hazard, and increased risk of conflict, for these concerns lie at
the heart of the unease that geoengineering field research engenders.
turally diverse set of research and management efforts”); cf. Walker, supra
note 187, at 841–44 (discussing how British Nuclear Fuels, a state-owned enterprise, exercised influence to preclude consideration of policy alternatives).
362. See Walker, supra note 187, at 839.
363. See Stirling, supra note 354, at 26 (noting possible costs of diversification).
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To gain the public’s trust, governance must be independent, transparent, participatory, and accountable. And to effectively oversee the hazards of geoengineering research, governance must draw on a wide range of expertise and be comprehensive and reflexive. In pursuit of these goals, the U.S.
government should initiate an ongoing programmatic technology assessment and invite the input of stakeholders and the
general public. Such an assessment can serve as a foundation
for establishing an oversight system for individual field experiments. A programmatic assessment can also inform policies to
prioritize research into techniques involving lesser systemic
and physical risks and to incorporate safeguards against these
risks.

